Tag: Alexander Adams

  • Alexander Adams: The Colston Statue Affair

    Alexander Adams

    This article briefly outlines what happened with the toppling of the Edward Colston statue in Bristol, why it happened and its ramifications.

    On 7 June 2020, a large protest took place in the centre of Bristol, ostensibly against racism. The large gathering was in contravention on national and local restrictions on public gatherings due to COVID-19. No dispersal was attempted by police. Some protesters formed a mob that attacked the statue of MP Edward Colston, erected in 1895. It was sprayed with paint, damage and toppled. It was then rolled into the nearby harbour. There were no arrests. The statue was later retrieved by the Council.

    Just as the mob did not detain itself over the personal record of Edward Colston, neither shall we. The heart of the matter is mob violence, threats of violence, vandalism and intimidation. The cause is irrelevant. Ask members of the social-justice mobs that attacked the statues of President Lincoln and Frederick Douglass why they chose those targets and they could not tell you. (A member of the mob that attacked Churchill’s statue in Westminster admitted in a television interview that she “had never met the man”.) The vastness of the mob’s anger is matched only by its ignorance.

    The police watched but did nothing. Apparently, some officers wanted to prevent the attack but were instructed by commanders not to intervene. The mayor was in the police control room. Bristol City Council has long wanted to remove the statue but was not able to force through the political decision. A majority of the polled population of Bristolians opposed removal of the statue. However, the left-wing council and mayor saw the opportunity to use the mob to act on their behalf. Rather than defying authority, the mob was acting in accordance with the wishes of authority in committing this crime and was successful in doing this with the connivance of Council, mayor and police commanders, who all shared a progressive political outlook. The council, which currently has on its website pages the legend #blacklivesmatter, tweeted its approval of the demonstration.

    It was not a statue celebrating slavery. It was not, notwithstanding the hysteria of the defilers, a device for perpetrating or restoring slavery. It was a monument to a respected gentleman, trader, employer, Member of Parliament and benefactor of his home city who happened to be caught up in a legal but ethically reprehensible business. One could not have devised a more perfect embodiment of the moral quagmire that ordinary men and women of good standing became enmeshed within because they were born into a particular era. The individuals that destroyed the statue would, if they had been born three hundred years earlier, have been caught up in exactly the same moral predicament and given it barely a thought. The statue was the ideal tool with which one could teach about how our morals are shaped by our era and how society gives sanction to dubious practices. By destroying the Colston statue, the mob refused to confront the awkward truth it presented: that we are all morally culpable due to the moral constriction of circumstances.

    The following month, serial opportunist Marc Quinn unveiled on the empty plinth without permission a 3D-printed statue of one of the protestors giving a black-power salute. It was taken down after one day. As a sculpture it was a failure – as all one-to-one replications are. (I know because I saw it in person.) It was a chance for a rich, state-supported London artist to wag his finger at Bristolians by (dare one say) colonising the vacant plinth in order to assert his moral superiority. It was half condescending stunt, half replacement tender. While the original Colston statue was a piece of serious artistry and a very handsome piece (see opposite and page 12), the Quinn effort was feeble. However, replacing an accomplished piece of public statuary honouring contributions of an important person with a plastic representation of a protestor who had been duped by local authorities into participating in an act of criminal vandalism is not an inapposite symbol of our era. 

    Collective Guilt

    The justification for destruction of part of the city’s heritage was that the statue celebrated a slaver. I have yet to hear the Council, mayor or protestors condemn the city’s mosques dedicated to a religion founded by a slave-owner. How many of those “anti-slavery activists” have debated Muslim theologians on the tenets that (under some interpretations) countenance slavery today? How many of them wrote letters of protest to the embassies of Chad, Mali and Sudan, where slavery still persists? In truth, there was no “anti-slavery activism” on 7 June; it was a carnival of virtue signalling that culminated in criminal-damage-as-performative-anti-racism.

    If the council puts Colston’s statue in the local museum in its vandalised state as a tourist attraction (rather than returning it to its plinth), I propose they replace it with a memorial to the Atlantic slave trade. Let us have an African slave in chains and with him his African slave-owner. This represents the historical reality that European slavery of Africans relied upon active participation of Africans, who sold to Europeans (and Arabs) prisoners of war, members of other tribes and unwanted members of their own tribes. And slavery wasn’t something only Africans endured – there were many “white” slaves too, including homeless children taken from the streets of London and sent to work in appalling conditions in the Tobacco Plantations in Virginia along with convicts who weren’t all serious felons but were imprisoned because of the consequences of extreme poverty. According to Don Jordan’s book White Cargo: The Forgotten History of Britain’s White Slaves in America, if you were transported from Britain and unlucky enough to end up in a Virginian plantation you could have a red hot bodkin pushed through your tongue before being hanged for stealing a rose from the owner’s garden. It is a must-read book for anyone concerned about Slavery. This portrayal would conflict with those who think in exclusive terms of Westerners as predators and non-Westerners as prey; such a proposal would likely not find favour with Bristol City Council.

    The overriding aim of social-justice activists is to impose upon the population a narrative of inherited collective guilt: white British people (historically and now) are complicit in the unique evils of colonialism and slavery. Thus, all action that collectively punishes this group is acceptable. This includes the destruction of their culture, public humiliation, rote apologies and reparations. None of us (whatever our colour) has experienced slavery or supported it; none of us should be forced to apologise for something our ancestors may (or may not) have approved of. Remember that we are also descendants of people who abolished slavery, forbade it abroad and patrolled the seas to curtail the Atlantic slave trade. Slavery in the Americas under the British took place at a time when there was no universal suffrage and therefore it was not a matter that could be approved of electorally by the British public. After initially participating in slavery abroad, no people ever did more to oppose slavery than the British.

    When a half-educated firebrand lectures you on slavery, ask her what year Britain abolished slavery and you will get no answer. Anti-slavery and anti-racism – in the current forms we see most publicly – are nothing more than excuses for a deep hatred of our society and its founding pillars of tradition, patriotism, capitalism, Christianity and colonialism. Social-justice activists delight in destruction, motivated by moral fervour and burning malice. They are not horrified by racism but secretly delighted, using it as a weapon as against well-meaning ordinary people, getting them to participate in broad coalitions. Activists invent new forms of “institutional/systemic” racism to maintain the illusion that non-racist people are inherently and implicitly racist and thus deserving of the elite’s control and castigation. This is the triumph of the righteous (mainly white) middle-class, university-educated allies of “marginalised minorities” over the hordes of (mainly white) working-class “racist thugs”. It is another manifestation of the class snobbery that refuted – then concealed – the mass rape of children and young women in cities across Britain because they were the “wrong” colour, religion and class.

    It could hardly be clearer than the Communist symbols sprayed on statues to Robert Peel, Churchill and Queen Victoria. Middle-class, university-educated vandals attack patriotic symbols that may not be revered but are widely respected by traditional patriotic, white working-class people. The general sentimental attachment to Baden-Powell, Churchill and Queen Victoria does not entail a complete acceptance of their opinions regarding race but now – in our hyper-charged, social-network-facilitated, emotionally labile cancel culture – accusations are enough to get a person or artefact removed from the public square. Cancel-culture definitions are ever expanding, ever changing, never appealable, never reversible. Offence-taking is used insincerely and tactically to claim territory (via cancellation) and to put people on the defensive; this process intimidates the majority, who become fearful, silent and compliant.

    Take a look at the hundreds of thousands of published pages and hours of lectures/speeches delivered by professionals in education and you will encounter a distorting mirror universe of social justice, where minorities in the West live hunted lives and ordinary social interaction are atrocities upon their dignity. This is a frighteningly alien world where there is talk of “human beings/Brown skins/Black bodies/marginalised voices” because to use the word “people” admits the possibility of a plurality of experiences, lives, viewpoints, tastes, wealth and politics. Social-justice activists literally talk of “skins” as if they were big-game trophy hunters. For activists, the “Black experience” is uniformly monolithic, invariably oppressed, irrefutably one of suffering; it is a narrative they use for material gain and political advantage. 

    What we can do?

    Do you think that taking down statues of Rhodes and Colston will satisfy activists or just encourage them? When actions are not goal-focused, limited and pragmatic but instead a hubristic religious crusade driven by spite and utopianism then they will be unremitting. When you have been trained by school, university and media to believe your society is founded upon injustices of slavery, rape and genocide of other peoples, then no price is too high and no reparations will suffice. Do you think that your culture is safe in the hands of groups which think this way? If these activists – so pliant, so poorly informed, so easily moved to incontinent fury – undeniably forgo empathy for people of the past, can they tolerate contradiction by the living?

    In these pages you will read of the onslaught on historical monuments and cultural artefacts committed by zealots, mainly in the USA. The events of this summer will not end in autumn; they have only just started. All across Britain, there are moves to destroy our culture, especially in London under the direction of the mayor. We must retain our statues. Even if they commemorate individuals we do not agree with, their presence reminds us of how our society has changed. How can we state that slavery was once acceptable if we have erased all public traces of it? Isn’t such action opening the doors to tomorrow’s conspiracy theorists? Either way, erasing history is not a practice that ends well for anyone. 

    Across the country, hectoring agitators, paid lobbyists, obsessive cranks and cynical politicians are (through legal means) attempting to remove public art that belongs to you. Defend physical culture by getting involved. Share this article. Subscribe to The Jackdaw and The Critic. Attend council meetings. Sign petitions. A website to monitor threats to public monuments and co-ordinate resistance is at www.saveourstatues.org.uk. Visit and share it; consider contributing.

    Should anyone think me partisan on this, I remind him/her that I have publicly deplored dismantlement of the Palast der Republik in Berlin, removal of GDR murals and statues, wrote in favour of many architectural projects in Communist countries and currently oppose removal of statues to Marx in the UK. Regardless of whatever you may assume my beliefs to be, I trust even critics will concede it would be misrepresentation to claim I have not consistently defended free expression and opposed iconoclasm. If you believe in these principles, I invite you to do the same and act, especially locally. Apathy and inaction will result in your culture being controlled and the history of your nation (good and bad) being erased.

    Alexander Adams’s book Iconoclasm, Identity Politics & the Erasure of History is published by Imprint Academic on 6 October.

  • Alexander Adams: Canon Fodder – November 2017

    Alexander Adams
    November/December 2017

    Alexander Adams investigates the status of the canon in art under Post-Modernism and the dangers of undervaluing it.

    The canon of great art has never been the target of greater ire than it is today, but many leftist critics and their traditionalist opponents misunderstand the canon. The truth is unsettling for both groups. This essay seeks to clarify the nature of the canon at a time when it is an especially contentious subject.

    Great Deeds Against the Dead

    Last year art-history A-level was scrapped due to low take-up, then, after a campaign to reverse the decision, it was reinstated. This allowed New Criticism a foothold in school art-history teaching. When the new curriculum was developed, there was a downgrading of the master artists of Europe. Sarah Phillips, designer of new art-history syllabus, said “It is a global specification. Students won’t just study the work of dead white men. They will have the opportunity to study Islamic architecture and work by men and women of all colours and creeds.” Perhaps students will be tested on artist skin colour in exams. 

    “Art history is the study of power, politics, identity and humanity; it makes perfect sense to keep the exam,” said Jeremy Deller. One doesn’t envy students wanting to learn about painting only to be dragooned into political-education courses and harangued on the purported crimes of their forefathers, who were more likely to have been agricultural labourers toiling in fields than redcoats bayonetting babies in India. Perhaps A-level art history would have better remained decently defunct.  

    Leftist critics characterise the canon as a white male Christian club. That view excludes ancient pre-Christians, undisclosed atheists/agnostics and recent additions to the canon but – those exceptions aside – white Christian men were ones making large-scale oil paintings and stone carvings up until recent centuries so Western European art is necessarily their art. Critics confuse corollary with cause. The canon has never been based on the identity of artists. Indeed, it is heedless of artist identity. Art in the canon is judged on intrinsic and extrinsic qualities without regard to maker. Numerous anonymous ancient and medieval art works are canonical.

    Incidentally, dismissing art because of the maker’s masculinity discards contributions of countless female models, patrons and collectors, not to mention wives, sisters and daughters who worked in studios and even painted parts of pictures. These women believed in and helped to make these paintings; if they could see activists agitating to have these paintings removed from sight they would likely be appalled and baffled at careless condemnation of art they loved.  

    The Exquisitely Efficient Machine 

    The canon is both the group of generally accepted masterworks (and, by inference, their makers) and the principles underlying that selection. Art historians, artists and knowledgeable enthusiasts have approximate lists of great essential art though details vary. There are major and minor figures in the canon and canons for specific countries and mediums. 

    The canon is a distillation of informed judgement over the course of centuries. It is an exercise in both discrimination and tolerance as one accepts the whole without agreeing with every part. Crucially, personal taste is irrelevant. You may not care for Rubens but he is important, influential and innovatory; he cannot be removed by you. The canon provides broad consensus while at the same time compelling no one to praise falsely. The canon cannot be imposed from above by either scholars or social activists. The canon endures despite fashion and politics but the contents of the canon are provisional.

    Dissent regarding the stature of an artist does not damage the canon; on the contrary, it strengthens it by forcing supporters of an artist to examine and refute (or accept) criticism. This process of continual testing winnows substandard art from the canon and proves the fitness of that which remains. It is an exquisitely efficient (though slow) machine for refining our understanding of art. The canon, far from being a machine of oppression and exclusion, is a meritorious mechanism for selecting the most important art on fairly universal principles for the education and pleasure of everyone. The canon has no racial, gender, sexual or personal prejudice. It is regional but not nationalistic. It accepts the professional and amateur, the sacred and profane.

    What is this “Canon”?

    There is no authoritative list of canonical works. The canon, by definition, cannot have a single fixed form. If you want to produce a list of canonical works take all narratives on art history, starting with Pliny going through Vasari and ending today, add respected monographs covering individual art movements and books of masterpieces of art. Add up all mentions or illustrations of individual art works then remove the least frequently cited third of that list, remove all works made in the last 40 years, remove anything made by a living artist. What remains is the canon. 

    The weaknesses of this definition are that it gives greatest statistical weight to recent views, to published (rather than privately expressed) opinions and to works of which we have photographic images. Frequency of citations proves nothing and does not qualitatively measure works. Popularity proves nothing except itself.

    The canon is not democratic nor is it just. It rewards audacity. The cuckoo which ejects the host’s chick from the nest will survive and prosper, so too the brilliant adopter can displace a talented but flawed inventor. Justice has never informed the canon nor can it. The canon is a hierarchy of competence which reflects societal appetite for exceptional achievement and it does not arbitrate historical priority or factual (or emotional) justice.

    Canon Criteria

    The presence of a single work (or body of works) produced by a now-deceased artist in the Western fine-art canon is due to it having at least one of three attributes still considered to apply today: (a) importance or influence, (b) originality or innovation, and (c) outstanding quality within an aesthetic field; with two minor attributes valued: (d) timeliness, and (e) lineage. To be a minor figure an artist needs only one of the minor attributes.

    Attributes (b), (d) and (e) need further comment. Originality need not be actual invention but being the outstanding exponent or populariser of a new material, style or subject. For example, no modern historian now assigns the invention of oil painting to the Van Eyck brothers but they were the first artists to bring the technique to perfection in panel painting and were historically credited as originators. Priority on its own is not enough.

    Timeliness is zeitgeist – encapsulating a particular culture during an era. Lynn Chadwick is a minor canonical figure. His metal sculpture of the 1950s embodies the spirit of an age (post-War figurative sculpture) while it is not strong enough to make Chadwick a major artist. Lineage is an attribute of the canon’s traditional didactic purpose. Perugino, a figure on the periphery of the canon, would probably have sunk from our view if he had not taught Raphael. 

    Man Proposes, the Canon Disposes

    There is something unusual about the way the fine-art canon operates, which may not have been remarked on before. Every artist who is – or has been – in the canon rises once and remains or sinks but he/she never rises for a second time. I cannot think of an example where an artist we regard as canonical has ever dropped out of the canon and later returned to the canon as significant as he/she was before. This is not a matter of fluctuating popularity but one of absolute neglect – a time when an artist was no longer taught or mentioned in general texts, only for that artist to be resurrected. It seems that once history has downgraded an artist gravely, it is a permanent change. I have never read this observation elsewhere.

    During his lifetime Anton Raphael Mengs (1728-79) was considered a genius comparable to Raphael. His paintings displayed great skill; his life drawings are excellent. His place in history seemed assured yet Mengs disappeared from the canon quickly and is hardly more than a footnote in art histories. Viewers found Mengs’s good qualities in other artists and nothing great or original to distinguish his art. Technical brilliance is no meal ticket to Parnassus. 

    Consider the case of Bernard Buffet (1928-99). In France, Buffet was the most lauded painter to mature in immediate post-War period. He was very successful in Japan, where a Buffet museum was founded. For several decades Buffet was hugely famous, fabulously rich and perhaps the worst ever painter to be considered great. His work is as crude, ugly, bombastic, modish and shallow as anything that has been shown on museum walls. Despite prizes and critical acclaim, by the time of his death Buffet was utterly forgotten; more than half of younger readers will never have heard his name let alone seen a Buffet painting in person. 

    The canon makes short work of poseurs such as Buffet and the technically gifted but banal such as Mengs. So, if you despair of the artists of today who are promoted as living links to the canon, fear not. 

    Modernism and the Canon

    Traditionalists beware: the canon is not a sword of truth which makes aesthetic distinctions and slays the dragon of Modernist art. There is no objective aesthetic standard which applies to all art in the canon. Even if we set aside Modernism, in aesthetic terms the canon ranges from the schematic (Byzantine), symbolic (Neolithic), semi-abstract (Cycladic) and decorative/abstract (Celtic manuscripts) to the naïve (Fontainebleau school), idealistic (Michelangelo) and realistic (Caravaggio). Modernist art cannot be excluded from the canon; it has already entered it. The only aesthetic criterion is excellence within a defined field. 

    Those who state “Raphael is part of the canon; in aesthetic terms, Pollock cannot be compared to Raphael; therefore Pollock cannot be part of the canon” are in error. Consider the rules of the canon. Raphael and Pollock are comparable in that they are both great exponents of their schools; their art is artistically influential, culturally important, original and typical of their period and place. In strictly canonical terms, Raphael is closer to Pollock than to Raphael’s own assistant Gianfrancesco Penni. Reverse engineering of what the canon is in order to exclude art one does not like is dishonest. Consider: the canon exists as a collective enterprise regardless of personal taste. One can dislike Pollock; one can argue against his art; one cannot exclude Pollock from the canon ex cathedra. One can propose and advocate for additions or subtractions regarding the canon but propositions will be decided upon collectively over a lengthy historical period.

    Bear in mind that the canon is not necessarily the best art ever produced. It is a collection of the best art that is commonly known and which it is vital (or useful) to be known by artists, scholars, art lovers and those more broadly interested in visual culture. The fact that you might have the world’s most beautiful painting hidden in your attic does not invalidate the canon because the canon is a collective body of knowledge which is comparative, commonly understood, widely accessible and not entirely based on aesthetic worth. There are plenty of beautiful works which are not canonical and plenty of canonical works which are not beautiful. If an ugly work of art meets the criteria for inclusion then it can be included. I would propose Asger Jorn’s more shocking “disfigurations” – defacements of junkshop pictures – as examples of ugly art which has already entered the canon.

    Counter-intuitive as it seems, it is a fact that no aesthetic criteria will fit the canon. Therefore, though aesthetic criteria are crucial to our judgement of art, aesthetic rules cannot generate a canon. Consider the cases of Mengs and thousands of gifted academicians whose art is tediously accurate and which will never supplant the wonky anatomies of Delacroix and Goya. In the article “New Order”, I suggested that viewers, curators and museum directors should continue the traditional approach of selecting and judging work on the bases of primarily aesthetic quality and secondarily historical value. This is not in conflict with the canon. Art appreciation is a personal matter which we practise every day; the canon is a collective endeavour which no individual (or single national or professional body) can arbitrate.

    Masterpieces and Blind Spots

    Due to the way art is discussed, there is a tendency to highlight masterpieces. They provide common reference points. The human memory has a limited capacity and books have limited pages, so (for the non-specialist) Cimabue’s Crucifixion serves to stand for his whole output. However, the canon can select works which are atypical. Meret Oppenheim’s Fur Teacup (1936) is an iconic work of Surrealism and is celebrated as such. It far surpasses the quality of all her other work. (Trust me, I’ve slogged through the monographs.) In that respect Fur Teacup is actually atypical of Oppenheim’s art, being so much better than her other work. The canon being efficient as it is, has pared down her entire output to the only good thing she made. Likewise, Richard Oelze’s masterpiece Expectation (1935-6) is the only work of his that is worth giving time to. The canon recognises masterpieces by journeyman artists.

    Consider the converse. The canon also admits bodies of works when no masterpiece exists. Paul Klee is an established figure in the canon, but there is no single painting, or even handful of paintings, which sums up Klee’s achievements. In Klee’s case any typical painting serves as an introduction to the diffuse body of works. 

    The canon does have weaknesses, mainly due to its didactic presentation of progress. There are marginal cases of artists who do not fit easily into eras or schools. The canon tends to overlook remarkable outsiders. Balthus springs to mind. I would say Balthus deserves to be in a canon of 20th-century painting on merit but he could justifiably be left out as being “unnecessary” to explain any era or movement. William Blake and Stanley Spencer are only relevant to the story of British art and can be completely omitted from an overview of Western art of their times.

    Another weakness of the canon is it has historically undervalued secular subjects, such as the still-life, landscape and marine. Grand subjects often overwhelm intimate reflection. A final series of weaknesses concerns the hierarchy of mediums. Since the rise of the reproduction print and photographic illustration, sculpture has been forced to the margins while painting has taken centre stage. Likewise, while separate canons for printmaking, watercolour and drawing have developed, they are generally viewed as subsidiary to painting and find only marginal places in histories of art.

    Post-Modernists and the Canon

    Post-Modernists loathe the canon for its specific qualities and its existence. The canon accretes slowly and selectively; it cannot be changed for political reasons and it cannot be legislated upon. The fact it does offer recognition for women/minority artists makes the canon even more hateful to Identarians. It is too slow and selective to comply with social-justice-activist demands that women/minorities be elevated en masse immediately and accepted universally. The canon compels no one to like or respect art. The canon rewards accomplishment not identity and – in Identarian eyes – effectively “bribes” women/minority artists by offering recognition to any artist who accepts the status quo and who makes art worthy of the canon. Identarian opposition to the status quo precludes participation in a canon which rewards application, patience, excellence and individuality; Identarians prioritise conformity, victimhood, impatience, birth rights and the right to demand instant change and exercise totalitarian control. The very existence of the canon is repugnant to Identarians, who feel it impedes social justice.

    There is no need to force women into the canon because the canon absorbs great art regardless. One cannot write of 20th- century portraiture or the legacy of Symbolism without mentioning Frida Kahlo, likewise with abstract sculpture and Barbara Hepworth. There are many other examples. Berlinde de Bruyckere is the most original and powerful sculptor of the figure since Giacometti and it would be surprising if her art did not find its way into the canon. Much to our editor’s dismay and disagreement, I suspect Jean-Michel Basquiat is also canon-bound. Traditionalists dislike the speed with which art accretes to the canon and it offends them to see non-traditional schools appended to the Golden Age of (insert preferred artist/school/era here). Traditionalists should propose recent makers of great art and await history’s verdict. The canon may discard all recent art and record a fallow period, as it has done for whole countries and eras. 

    Post-Modernists too reject accretion to the canon. For them the accretion is too slow. They have two views on the canon – that it must be abolished or rewritten. Neither of these authoritarian tendencies can be achieved in a permanent form. Abolition is impossible because people have a natural tendency to form groups, celebrate exceptional excellence and class things in terms of quality and thereby reach group consensus. Rewriting is impossible because no one group can dictate the canon and – as we have seen with political appointees such as Socialist Realist and National Socialist artists – the canon rejects bad art. 

    Post-Modernists hate the canon partly because they do not believe in group consensus. They do not believe that art progresses or that a narrative (other than a socio-economic one) can be drawn from art history. Post-Modernists contend that the idea that multiple groups and individuals over eras can reach agreement is an illusion which conceals collusion, oppression and exclusion.   

    So, if abolition and rewriting are impossible, why now write an article addressing Post-Modernist attitudes towards the canon? 

    Firstly, art history students are suffering because they are not being taught the canon in a thorough way, thus limiting their understanding. Even to oppose the canon you must at least know it. Secondly, we all suffer when political activists manipulate education and curation of art. Thirdly, elevation to the canon is a prize to be striven for and fame has inspired plenty of artists to perform to their best. Fourthly, symbolic changes, even ineffectual ones against weak opponents – and there are no weaker opponents than the dead – encourage further encroachment in other areas of life. 

    Lastly, if traditionalists and moderates wish to oppose Post-Modernism effectively they should examine what the canon really is before they invoke it. If you support the canon you must acknowledge it in its totality, even with schools and artists you dislike, and you must accept it will accrete new art. As I have previously written, traditionalists who battle both Post-Modernism and Modernism will drive away Modernists and moderates, who are their natural allies in opposing Post-Modernism. Traditionalists, Modernists and moderates today all have common cause against Post-Modernist authoritarianism, quota programming and identity politics. They have differing tastes but their principles largely overlap. 

    In the past many Marxists agitated against the canon whilst covertly enjoying its art. They understood that dissidents savour the moral superiority of principled protest while enjoying the fruits of a system they ostensibly oppose. What is different now is that New Left agitators are in positions of power unopposed by conservatives or connoisseurs within institutions or the political class. They can alter curricula, defund research, publish propaganda as art theory and take down pictures in museums; they are in a position to actually suppress and – in the case of historic statues – destroy. 

    The canon is nothing less than a manifestation of our civilisation. To learn from and contribute to the canon (as writers, makers and art lovers) is to contribute to civilisation and is to affirm our belief in collective wisdom, consensus and progress, regardless of our personal taste in art.

  • Alexander Adams: Women in Art Today

    Alexander Adams

    We are told that in many fields women face systematic disadvantage and are under-represented. It has become a core belief of many and goes almost unchallenged. When politicians came under pressure regarding supposed gender discrimination in the workplace, the British government conducted a survey of arts organisations. The 2018 report found that women comprise 56% of the British arts-sector workforce. The Arts Council of England has a National Council comprising 53% women and an overall workforce of 65% women. This evidence seems to contradict the narrative that British organisations reflect male power. At the very least, female administrators and human-resources staff must be implementing a form of patriarchy which is proving strangely ineffective. 

    I wondered why the female-disempowerment story had such currency when reality appeared to contradict that. So, starting in July 2018 for 12 months, I collected data on the press releases that I encountered as a critic in the forms of emails, publisher catalogues, magazine advertisements and notices on specialist websites regarding the international art world. I neither screened nor sought out data. I wanted to test the narrative that women in the arts face obstacles that their male colleagues do not – in other words, women are subject to widespread sexism due to the actions of individuals, organisations and systems. I daily checked every public statement relating to living individuals of ascertainable gender, classing each entry under appointment, prize/award or event. I tallied data monthly and derived from it percentages. I discounted any announcements relating to dead artists, non-fine-art events, events without an identifiable artist and previously announced events. Announcements relate to events in Europe, North America, Australia and a few from other regions. 

    The event data are numbers of opportunities not individuals because it was impossible to count individuals in events such as art fairs. Thus an event of 2 male artists is listed as “1 male opportunity”; an exhibition of 8 men and 3 women is listed as “1 mixed opportunity”. Each entry of unknown gender or mixed gender is counted as 0.5 male and 0.5 female opportunities.

    Although the system was neither comprehensive nor watertight, it produced remarkably clear consistent data.

    1.  Women outnumber men in recent appointments.

    Data shows that, in the cases documented, women are appointed to a greater number of permanent positions than men in public and private venues, arts organisation and to more temporary positions as organisers, directors and curators of events. This strongly suggests that there is no bias against women in hiring and promotion of individuals for permanent and temporary positions. It is fair to conclude there is no systematic bias against women being appointed to jobs within the fine arts. If, as it seems, a) women are entering existing positions at a greater rate than men and b) they are entering at a greater rate than that of the increase of positions in the field overall, then the field is becoming increasingly female populated.  

    2.  Female artists outperform male artists in recent fine-art prizes and awards.

    Considering the multiple estimates of the population of artists dividing 40-45% female and 55-60% male, female artists win more prizes than men proportionate to the percentage of the artist population that they comprise. All other things being equal, a female artist is two to three times more likely than a male artist to receive an award or prize. It is fair to conclude there is no systematic bias against female artists receiving prizes and awards.

    3.  There is over-performance of women artists in recent fine-art prizes and awards.

    Working on the basis that women form 40-45% of all professional active fine artists, we can see a measurable consistent over-performance by female artists. Different women were receiving prizes, awards, honours, scholarships and so forth, so it was not a case of a few skilled individuals winning multiple prizes due to personal merit and thereby distorting data. Male artists are under-represented in terms of fine-art prizes and awards. It is fair to conclude that female artists statistically over-perform and male artists under-perform in the area of receiving prizes and awards. 

    4. Female artists are represented in recent arts events at a level commensurate with that which they form in the artist population.

    Working on the basis that women form 40-45% of all professional and active fine artists, we can see that they have opportunities commensurate with their proportion of the artist population. The figure is remarkably consistent month-on-month. It is the largest dataset in the survey and the most consistent in terms of percentages. It is fair to conclude there is no systematic bias against women artists participating in fine-art events.

    5.  Recent female-only events outnumber male-only events.

    The total number of specifically male-only events was very small compared to specifically female-only events. For whatever reasons, fewer events around single-gender bases were devoted to male artists than female ones. It is fair to conclude that specifically single-gender events significantly favour female artists by providing more opportunities for female artists than for male artists. 

    6.  The dataset is of adequate size.

    The larger is the dataset the greater the consistency. Appointments and Prizes/Awards – the groups with the least amount of data – fluctuated most; Events had most entries and was most consistent. Inevitably, a study with a larger dataset would be more accurate.

    7.  The data is internally consistent.

    Data did not fluctuate dramatically over period and did not seem to be seasonally affected. Even in months with relatively little data, percentages for these months remained consistent with high-data months. This suggests that the data is relatively reliable and consistent. It also suggests that as trends were stable that the data shows a persistent state rather than a temporary situation.

    8.  The data seems a reasonable reflection of reality. 

    There is no indication – factually, logically or anecdotally – that this data is not a workable approximation of reality. The data reflects the experiences of most artists, art critics, art collectors and other art professionals rather than any political narrative.    

    9. These conclusions are in need of future correlation and correction. Further statistical models and datasets are needed to confirm or disprove the conclusions above. 

    Overall, these figures – while being a limited dataset – are an indication of what is likely the true state of affairs. To my knowledge, this is the first time such data has been compiled and for that reason alone it is of value. A more comprehensive survey is needed. However, there is nothing in this data or the conclusions that seems not broadly representative of the current situation.

  • Alexander Adams: New Order – September 2017

    Alexander Adams
    September/October 2017

    New Order

    An Allegory

    Once upon a time there was a society which made objects that had meaning and that people enjoyed looking at. The society put these objects in museums so that more people could enjoy them. Then an elite of that society decided that the objects did not matter so much but the skin colour and reproductive organs of the object-makers mattered a lot. Displaying objects made by people of certain skin colours or possessing certain reproductive organs pleased other people and made them feel virtuous. The elite counted the numbers of museum objects made by people of certain skin colours or possessing certain reproductive organs. These statistics measured how virtuous the society was compared to other societies. More and more people were encouraged to visit the objects to display their virtue or to acquire virtue. The elite wanted all the people to visit the objects even though some people preferred to do other things. When the elite persuaded people of certain skin colours or possessing only small amounts of money to visit the objects, the elite said it made society better when actually all it did was make the elite feel less guilty. It was known that most people liked meaningful or beautiful objects but it was decided by the elite that the virtuous statistics were more important. The elite decided that people’s unhappiness about the elite using people’s money to buy for museum objects that were neither meaningful nor beautiful was caused by people not being virtuous enough. Some people thought the idea of virtuous statistics was silly but most of them did not say that because it would have been rude.

    Murder Machines

    This year a sculpture by Sam Durant entitled Scaffold was erected in a sculpture park managed by Walker Art Center, Minneapolis. The wooden sculpture juxtaposed elements of playground-activity structures and gallows. One minor aspect of Scaffold referred to the hanging of Dakota Native Americans in 1862 as part of struggles between the Dakota Nation and the American government. That reference had been missed until it was pointed out, at which time a campaign to remove the sculpture was begun by the Dakota. “This is a murder machine that killed our people because we were hungry,” said a member of the Dakota Nation, equating Scaffold with an actual gallows that hanged members of the Dakota. In May the museum destroyed Scaffold and the artist renounced his work. 

    This year there was a protest by some black artists against the display at the Whitney Biennial of a painting of murdered black activist Emmett Till. Black activists lobbied to have the painting by Dana Schutz, a white artist, removed as offensive and hurtful. “The subject matter is not Schutz’s,” said one protestor, claiming ownership and authority over the representation of a historical event.  

    In these two cases, activists claimed ownership over aspects of history in order to suppress art works. In one case it resulted in the destruction of art. Pressure groups have noticed the weakness of curators, administrators and politicians and their unwillingness to protect art from censorship. Sympathetic towards notions of social justice, administrators sometimes submit to emotional blackmail by groups which demand censorship.  

    Delacroix did not have to be Greek to paint Massacre at Chios; Sargent did not have to be either British or a combatant to paint Gassed; Callot did not seek approval of relatives of hanged men before publishing prints. These are iconic touchstones for appreciating events in world history, yet according to supporters of identity politics such art should not be made now. Groups should own their histories, curb free speech and suppress or destroy art deemed offensive. There was a time, not so long ago, when we derided Soviet agronomists’ dismissal of Mendelian genetics as “bourgeois” and Nazi ministers damning branches of science as “Jewish”, yet today art can be “too white and male”. 

    Identarianism

    Identarianism (or identity politics) is a political belief system which has had huge influence over politics in Western countries for the last three decades. It sprang from New Left principles developed in the wake of failed attempts at revolution in 1968 and revelation of the atrocities and failures of Communism. It seeks to advance social justice and enforce relative equality through incremental advances in social capital of supposedly disadvantaged subsets such as women, ethnic and sexual minorities and so forth. There is commensurately punitive retraction of rights from supposedly advantaged groups such as men, white people and so forth. 

    Identarianism is essentially a political manifestation of Post-Modernism which acts by harnessing factional interests. In the same way Marxism co-opted movements of emancipation, workers’ rights, anti-clericism, anti-colonialism and so on, Identarianism gathers factional interests under the umbrella of Post-Modernist relativism by promising social justice.

    Here are some tenets of Identarianism:

    1. Every person has involuntary affiliations from birth (ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, physical ability, family religion, etc.) and shares a common identity with other members of his or her subsets. These identity subsets are not generally mutable. (Mutability of gender and sexual orientation are controversial issues within Identarianism.) Subset identities necessarily form a strong part in determining one’s outlook. People do not have universal qualities (as in the Enlightenment model of universal rights) but have compound qualities derived from their subset identities. Equality is therefore relative not universal.

    2. Subsets are subject to pervasive networks of personal, institutional and social prejudice, discrimination and disadvantage. This oppression is collective and endemic.

    3. Social, legal, political and financial power – and its converse – is heritable. 

    4. Privilege and guilt is collective and heritable. 

    5. Subset members have a right to demand redress or reparations for collective discrimination and oppression by oppressing subset(s).

    6. Subset members can work together to promote the fulfilment of their potential (called “equity”; see below) and to reduce power/privilege of other subsets. Subsets can work together to form tactical alliances in order to achieve social and legal change. Dialogue is power negotiation between inherently unequal subsets; compromise is acceptance of oppression.

    7. Identities are formed of multiple subsets and these overlapping definitions are described as examples of intersectionality.

    8. Some subsets experience more discrimination (or privilege) than others. This is (relatively) quantifiable. An individual’s position is determined by his or her specific intersectionality.  

    9. Culture and language are sources of power/oppression and should be used to enact social justice. Social justice is either a) the relative equalisation of power/privilege of subsets or b) realisation of potential in unequal ways (see below).

    10. One cannot understand or judge members of another subset. A subset culture is unique and the experience of its members is unfathomable. Only members of a subset have the right to speak about the experience of members of that subset.

    11. It is injurious for a person to use or appropriate culture, history or language of another’s subset. 

    12. One best understands – and is understood by – members of one’s own subsets. Each subset has a shared culture. It is not expected or encouraged for a person to form voluntary personal affiliations across subset boundaries except for purposes of temporary political action. Strong affiliation for another’s subset is akin to appropriation. 

    13. Exercise of imagination, empathy and fantasy are opportunities for potential (even unconscious) prejudice, misapprehension and distortion to occur and should therefore be avoided. 

    14. Any of the rules above can be broken to promote a subset, prove the truth of identity politics or to otherwise further the cause of Identarianism. 

    An example of rule 14 modifying rule 11 is that it would be fair for a black person to appropriate white Western culture because the black man is relatively disadvantaged. If a white man appropriates black culture this is an act of oppression. If a black man claims he is interested only in black art this is expected (rule 12). If a white man claims he is only interested in art by white men this is narrow-minded bigotry. 

    Never Fast Enough, Never Far Enough

    Identarianism is not a fuzzy warm principle of being nice to people and treating others equally – quite the contrary. It demands people be treated unequally. It divides people into subsets, classifies individuals’ worth minutely with matrices of privilege and social status, undercuts individuals’ autonomy and discourages (even curtails) individuals’ forming personal taste. It is incompatible with humanistic Enlightenment values. It accommodates factional interests and dehumanises opponents. It seeks to suppress free speech and free thought. Identarianism is dictatorial and dehumanising to its core; as an ideology it is riven by contradiction, hypocrisy and double-think. Identarianism is part nihilistic revolutionary movement, part narcissistic cult of selfhood, part religion of moral fury. It nurtures a culture of self-hatred, guilt and contempt for Western civilisation even – especially – among middle-class white people. 

    Look at the groups removing “politically objectionable” statues. Look at university-student mobs which shout down or assault public speakers. Look at student bodies which demand “safe spaces” and ban discussion as “hate speech”. This is Identarianism in its purest form, where it expresses the mentality and emotional tenor of even those who consider themselves moderates. Most activists do not fully understand the origins, tenets and implications of their ideology. No matter. Consider the Cultural Revolution, when commissars harnessed the anger of young idealists to instigate an orgy of righteous cultural destruction. Identarianism is not simply another way of viewing society, which can co-exist with other outlooks; it is an entity which has evolved to suppress opposition and destroy cultural expression. 

    Identarians do not have much time for old art because a) its artists and subjects do not reflect the demographic profile of today’s society; b) it rarely has a clear “socially progressive” message; and c) it resists co-option to Identarian aims. Beyond justifying the general Marxist declaration that spousal portraits and paintings of livestock and land constitute evidence of the capital classes recording possession of chattels, old art cannot be used to further social justice. This is, to be fair, an accurate assessment in purely political terms if one has didactic aims and no aesthetic, cultural or historical curiosity. If I were a curator in the Identarian movement, I would be consigning old art to the vaults and lobbying for deaccession rights. 

    To Identarians, when change seems so gradual and the historic burden so outrageous, implementation of affirmative action (including – unstated – quotas) seems not only desirable but necessary and those who will be disadvantaged by quotas are unavoidable collateral damage. Individuals who advocate caution are revanchists. For a firebrand who believes he or she is on the right side of history, change cannot come fast enough or go far enough. 

    New Criticism and Post-Modernism

    To understand why Identarianism has such purchase inside the art world one needs to understand New Criticism. 

    New Criticism in art history is an outgrowth of Marxist analysis of culture. It produces socio-economic critiques of art production/reception and is driven by theory in the fields of women’s/black/queer/post-colonialist studies. New Criticism is leftist, more theoretical than historical and underpinned by French post-structuralist philosophy. New Criticism is at the core of most art-history university education, existing uneasily alongside traditional art history. A common strand in New Criticism is distrust of aesthetics, formalist analysis of art and anything that could be construed as connoisseurship. New Criticism, Post-Modernism and identity politics began in the late 1960s and developed in parallel and in symbiosis.  

    New Criticism is predicated upon the fracturing of the consensus in Western values. Post-Modernism states that an infinite variety of perspectives and interpretations means consensus is both impossible and irrelevant. (“All values are relative” is an unqualified assertion of an unconditional truth which negates itself, but never mind.) Where all values are relative there can be no society-wide standards for appreciation and evaluation of art; hence the development of multiple strands within New Criticism, each with different concerns, languages and value systems. Whereas Modernist art was judged carefully in terms of its visual content, Post-Modernist art exists in a zone free of all formalist analysis; its appearance is not only inscrutable and illegible but actually arbitrary and meaningless in visual terms. 

    Nowadays many art critics, curators and theoreticians do not enjoy art; they do not like looking at art or discussing how it operates visually; New Criticism says that this is unimportant as only contextual power structures around art production and reception matter. This ideology breeds theoreticians with a positive disdain towards the visual qualities of art.  New Criticism and Identarianism are tools for identification of power structures and are antipathetic towards aesthetic appreciation, ambiguity, personal reflection, dissent, individualism and even pleasure. Pleasure in appreciation of form and technique, interest in creative decisions, appreciation of beauty, wonder at the experience of being transported into a different world or era, delight in discovery, joy through empathetic engagement – all these are alien to New Criticism and Identarianism.  

    What Art Is

    While New Criticism can provide insights into aspects of art production/reception, it never comes close to describing (let alone explaining) our responses to art as a whole or delineating why we respond more strongly to certain objects rather than to other similar objects. Syncretic criticism on a grounding of formalist analysis, traditional art history, aesthetics, iconography and literary and scientific knowledge – directed by self-scrutiny – is a more valuable approach to art criticism. To advocates of New Criticism that sounds suspiciously like bourgeois connoisseurship – perhaps it is. 

    I have previously given  the definition of fine art as follows: a non-utile physical object appreciated primarily for its appearance which can function on an aesthetic and emotionally engaging level when shorn of all original cultural context (e.g. cave painting, Cycladic art, African tribal objects viewed as art rather than religious devices, etc.). (Technically, that means Conceptual art is not art, but that’s another subject.) Although mythology, allegory, literary sources and biographical information can inform readings, they are never central or even primary. It does not matter how sophisticated an argument is put forward in a work of visual art (a medium which by its nature is unsuited to conveying complex intellectual ideas), if a work of art is not appreciated on either a human/emotional level or aesthetic basis it will sink from view. Museum basements are full of prize-winning allegories which are unendurably tedious even for cultured visitors. Syncretic criticism can ably discuss and explain why certain works of art succeed or fail; New Criticism cannot, though – to be fair – its proponents do not believe art can succeed or fail.

    Modernists and traditionalists should make common cause against Identarianism. While Modernists and traditionalists disagree about aesthetics, both groups care passionately about the appearance of art. Identarians do not. They do not believe that aesthetics exist. New Criticism (which subordinates art’s visual character to political readings), Feminism (which seeks redress for perceived historical injustice) and Identarianism (which states that culture is a tool to be used to combat privilege) bolster curators who believe that art which cannot be turned to political purposes should be dismissed, subordinated or suppressed. 

    Women’s Art

    Due to multiple causes, in terms of proportion, women artists working in major art fields were in a minority until the late 20th Century. The lack of women in the Western canon is complex and relates to at least four social factors which led to one significant consequence:

    A.   Social pressure strongly discouraged women of upper and middle classes from pursuing manual crafts for income.

    B.   Women had difficulty in studying art because of restrictions on entering academies, apprenticeships and gaining access to male life models, which led to few women gaining high-level skills, experience and qualifications.

    C.   Women were often barred from joining guilds and societies and were therefore impeded from engaging in professional commissions and making their livelihoods.

    D.   Childcare and domestic duties often restricted the amount of time women had to make art.

    Consequently, women artists rarely practised large-scale history/religious oil painting and stone carving – genres and mediums that were central to art historical canons. Instead women artists often practised the “minor” arts of drawing, watercolour painting, pastel painting, crafts and folk art. These fields have traditionally been classed subsidiary to oil painting and stone carving – much to the chagrin of practitioners both male and female. Therefore there were relatively few women artists working at a professional level before the late 19th Century and thus there is little historical art by women in museums.

    Here is the sleight of hand which justifies affirmative action: “Look at the statistics of how little art by women is included in art-museum collections. This demonstrates there is an implicit masculine bias in judging what is suitable for art canons and proves there is a campaign of exclusion and suppression which continues to this day.” Historically there were specific restrictions on women entering the fine arts. However, today cohorts of fine-art graduates are often female dominated. Many administrators, curators, tutors and scholars are women. In my experience, lower and middle ranks of arts administration are hugely dominated by women, who are rapidly rising to top positions. Of the journals I write for, half have female editors; every single editorial assistant is female. The staffs of publishing house press departments are almost all female. Roughly 90% of the museum press officers I have liaised with are female. I would love to meet a caste of oppressive bearded patriarchs in the arts so I could gaze upon them in wonder and curiosity. I could shake their hands and wish them farewell.

    A statistical imbalance from a broad swathe of history is used to justify affirmative action applied to the current art scene where no exclusion exists. The just campaign for equal rights has been won; the new cause is for preferential rights. To the assertion that women/minorities faced worse discrimination in the past and that quota programming is a small price to pay, one can say two things: firstly, the price is heavy enough for individuals who have to bear the burden of this “historic redress” and, secondly, discrimination in the past was wrong and it is wrong today.

    Equity Not Equality

    Equity is different from equality. Equality means parity and neutrality. Equity means reward determined by input or worth, not necessarily equal. Equality is problematic for Identarians and Post-Modernists because it produces inconvenient results. Despite decades of equal opportunity, certain demographic groups tend to choose particular academic subjects less often and – as groups – perform on average better or poorly within their population cohorts. So, faced with this situation, Identarians have reversed the target. No longer is it equality of opportunity which is important, it is equality of outcome. This is equity, in Post-Modernist terms. 

    Since oppressed individuals struggle against society, academia and privilege, they should be given preferential treatment to compensate for their disadvantages. The individual is valued as a victim, to be patronised and promoted regardless of his/her unique circumstances and actions. He/she is merely a figurehead, role model or token. The humanistic values of equality of worth, dignity and rights as ideals are nullified by a capricious and inscrutable system which not only denies equality as a target but even as a possibility. 

    In employment this leads to affirmative action, in academia to equity recruitment, in culture to quota programming.         

    Quotas v. Art

    Many Feminists (including Dr Balshaw) suggest that active steps must be taken to increase the public presence of female artists. Here are five flaws to collecting and exhibiting art on the basis of statistics:

    Firstly, targets diminish art. They reduce every artist (indeed every person) to a representative of subsets categorised by gender, race, etc. Artists become featureless interchangeable tokens in abstract calculations. It neglects the subject, quality and intellectual content of art and makes labels more important than art. It views artists as more important than art.

    Secondly, targets patronise artists. The reputations of Barbara Hepworth, Gwen John, Frida Kahlo and many other women have risen as high in their fields as those of male counterparts. Their art has become recognised without quota programming, on its intrinsic merit as art. Fairly or unfairly, quota programming will cast a shadow over the new generation of female artists who will benefit from it. 

    Thirdly, targets patronise viewers. A generation of viewers will be subject to second-rate art promoted through a quota system. It will teach the lesson: what you do is less important that who you are. Inspiring examples of women (and men) attaining success through hard work, skill and invention will be replaced by the example of passive mediocre individuals who were selected because their skin colour or reproductive organs fulfilled a quota. A more dispiriting message is hard to imagine.

    Fourthly, targets are unworkable. Should half of all the art we view be produced by women? How would that be calculated: by number of artists or artworks? What about unattributed works? Will living artists have to register data or will a committee verify data to prevent artists wrongly self-identifying in order to gain advantage? Who will arbitrate these matters? 

    Fifthly, targets are meaningless. In what way is a museum which displays 50/50 male and female artists a good museum? Viewers who are engaged by art not artists would be content with museums completely filled with women’s art if that art were the best art available. An obsession with statistics is the only fixed point in Identarian arts policy because all other issues – what is art, how can one judge art, what is art for – are all rendered unanswerable (or null) by Post-Modernism. 

    Predictions

    From the statements of Dr Balshaw, her track-record at the Whitworth Art Gallery and Tate’s recent policies, we can guess that her tenure will be marked by three aims: a) a drive to increase levels of attendance; b) attempting to alter visitor demographics; and c) altering the demographics of artists represented. Here are some predictions:

    1. Collection and exhibition of art will be increasingly driven by the imperative to promote female/minority artists regardless of aesthetic or formal qualities of their art. There will be a drive to pack the collection with art by women/minorities in an attempt to reach arbitrary statistical targets. The contemporary collection will become a massive ever-inflating multi-million-pound experiment in social engineering grounded on untested principles, driven by ideology and set to utilitarian goals: to demonstrate virtue and make visitors virtuous.

    2. As in all politically driven economies which prioritise production and performance targets (centralised national economies, educational and health-care systems, etc.), there will be an increasing tendency to distort, partially report and fabricate figures to suggest increased attendance and greater consumption of art by minorities and the poor. Targets will be altered and definitions manipulated to compensate for poor results.

    3. There will be an increase in the practice of piggybacking shows of lesser known female/minority artists by attaching them to shows of more popular artists, regardless of whether the linkage is artistically/aesthetically appropriate. Attendees of Tate Liverpool’s exhibition of Leonora Carrington will remember a neighbouring room devoted to Cathy Wilkes. Both exhibitions were on the same ticket. Many visitors – seeing a room filled with contemporary art unrelated to Carrington – did not even enter the Wilkes room. However, Tate reports attendance of the Wilkes and Carrington shows as equal.  

    4. Space devoted to historical (pre-Modern art) in Tate Britain will be steadily reduced. Presentations of historical art will increasingly disregard art-historical standards. Curatorial staff and financial resources will be redirected towards contemporary art. Departing staff who handled pre-Modern art will not be automatically replaced. 

    5. Interpretative texts will reduce discussion of stylistic aspects and will highlight social dimensions of art. In an attempt to make texts as accessible as possible, they will be simplified to a degree that errors will become frequent, undetected by staff who will be under-informed about art history.

    The Fate of the Tate

    The Tate has numerous problems. It has multiple subjects to cover (British, contemporary and world art). It does too many things (maintaining and expanding a collection, hosting exhibitions, running a website, maintaining four venues and organising education/outreach programmes, publishing, conservation, research, hospitality, retail, fundraising, membership services, publicity and so on). It has too many staff. It has too much art. It must continually increase income. It must continually increase attendance. The Tate’s fundamental problem is that it does not know why it exists; this will only get worse over Dr Balshaw’s era, with its promised blend of identity politics, populism, community events, pop culture and an influx of school parties, not to mention a massive acquisition drive.

    When the existence of museums depends on popular consent and museum funding depends on reaching a mass audience, curators tend to make art as approachable as possible. Yet the more art is presented as just another piece of everyday life, the more averagely informed people wonder what the purpose of an art museum is. Making art more popular by adapting it to ape pop culture (or by co-opting pop culture as art) increases engagement but decreases respect towards art. Pop culture in museums cannot help but be a feeble denatured mimicry of the pop culture that fills the rest of the world.  

    People are not helpless dolts. Many of them yearn to have new experiences, to learn, to overcome obstacles. Rather than saying “fine art means whatever you want and it’s just ordinary life”, tell them “fine art is complicated and dense but if you invest time and thought you will get unique rich experiences and insights into the world and human nature”. If you were told (the lie) that fine art is just ordinary life, why would you bother with art?  

    In a Post-Modern multi-cultural age, cultural institutions lose morale and direction because they have no moral or intellectual underpinning. If museum staff do not believe fine art has intrinsic value as art (not just as a demographic signifier) then they cannot explain art. If even experts cannot explain why art is important, they (and their museums) deserve to go. Dr Balshaw, who studied English and critical theory not art history, is an arts-venue manager who has demonstrated little knowledge of art history and is thus in the worst possible position to put forward an intellectual and moral case for high art. 

    Instead of experiencing fascination slowly develop in a quiet gallery, today’s teenager is inside a cultural mall facing a Sam Taylor Wood video installation in a noisy, overcrowded room. “Seen better on YouTube,” he says and wanders off – and who would disagree? Frankly, I’d rather be watching YouTube too. Arts-venue managers (as opposed to art historians, who used to run museums) are terrified of silent static art, of allowing visitors to choose to engage or walk away, and – like an anxious mother – chop art into tiny morsels without context or jangle bright geegaws such as interactive experiences to capture attention. But that is exactly what everyone experiences elsewhere all the time. Why go to a museum to bow your head over a museum-specific mobile-phone app when you could do that sitting at home? 

    But surely those morsels entice visitors to learn more. Oh? Where? In a chaotic museum which cannot properly display that art, label it informatively or explain why it is important? Showing films, staging concerts, hosting performances, holding lectures, providing educational activities – all of these are done better, cheaper and smarter by cinemas, private galleries, concert halls and schools with facilities adapted to those purposes and staffed by professionals who are experts. The only thing an art museum does better than any other venue is displaying painting and sculpture. It could almost have been designed for that purpose. 

    The Tate is so intent on being second-rate in as many areas as possible it neglects its core mission. A museum such as the Tate should conserve, present and explain art objects of the highest aesthetic quality and historical worth. Clarity, focus and excellence – and the respect that would generate – will secure the future for a slimmed Tate. But the circus must go. Exhibiting and collecting a cross-section of the entirety of the world’s high and pop culture in its myriad manifestations in a museum barely capable of presenting its limited collection of British and Western Modernist art up to 1970 is not only impossible, it is insanity. 

    Accept that not everyone will be interested in fine art, as not everyone is interested in classical music, historical monuments and public gardens. So be it. High art has always been a minority interest. Is high art elitist? No. It returns as much as one is willing to put in, like all areas of the arts which require effort before providing rewards of lasting value. The drive to make high art a mass viewing activity is motivated by curatorial self-interest, cultural insecurity and financial necessity. It is not viable. If a museum has (due to poor decision-making) an unmanageably vast collection and an enormous number of staff and consequently locks itself into an unsustainable counter-productive cycle of performance targets to attain ever-greater income simply to survive then it deserves to fail.

    I have no personal animosity towards Dr Balshaw. Certainly, anyone who has run a large arts venue financially successfully has admirable abilities. However, anyone whose approach to leadership is essentially managerial, whose principles are informed by identity politics and Post-Modernism, who has no apparent belief in the functions and value of high art (distinct from pop culture) and who cannot identify or defend the core mission of a national art collection will only make worse the situation at an already unwieldy, organisation. Instead of being the Tate’s most suitable fundraising director, Dr Balshaw may, sadly, be the Tate’s least suitable director.

  • Alexander Adams: Why are Artists Poor? – July 2017

    Alexander Adams
    July/August 2017

    Why Are Artists Poor?

    Imagine the most absurd and outrageous provocations about art that you can. For example: there is no such thing as a pure work of art; artists are unusually ill-informed; there is no market reward for good art; government subsidies make artists poor. Both defensive supporters of state funding and critical traditionalists will be muttering that art should not be viewed as an economic product or an investment. Both sides believe that art and money should be separated; the influence of money in the art market is deleterious to the production/appreciation of art. Yet how many of these assumptions are accurate and where is the economic evidence to back up these views? 

    Artist and social economist, Professor Hans Abbing has looked at the fine arts (encompassing dance, classical – not pop – music, opera and theatre but primarily concentrating on the visual fine arts) and sees an economy that does not function like any other. In Why Are Artists Poor? Abbing seeks to understand how this singular market operates, drawing on academic research and statistics and demonstrating through anecdotal examples. Some of Abbing’s findings make profoundly uncomfortable reading for people who accept many common assumptions about the arts. Here are Abbing’s main findings: 

    Art is Used as a Social Marker

    Abbing states that class largely determines one’s attitude to high and low art. “As long as there is social stratification and as long as art products are used to mark a person’s position on the social ladder, an asymmetric judgment of art products will exist. People higher on the ladder look down on the art of people lower than them, while the latter do not look down on, but look up to the art of the former.” Those ascending the social ladder will wish to consume high art while those descending will cling to high art despite straitened circumstances. This explains why a carpet tycoon in China buys an Andy Warhol as a symbol of his improved social status and great wealth, while an unemployed professor will still love Mondrian and Mahler even if deprived of his former position.

    The fine/high arts are largely consumed and produced by the middle and upper classes. One could also view it another way: art of amateur and unqualified makers (produced by a constituency with a greater proportion of lower-class producers) is categorised as low, hobby or folk art not as high art. There seems a consensus that less-educated people believe that high-brow art is “not for them”; in other words, it is made for the middle and upper classes. It may also be that they feel alienated by contemporary art. We can all think of individual exceptions but data about exhibition attendance bears out Abbing’s thesis.

    Abbing admits in an appendix that attitudes towards the high/low divide are changing and that this lower-class deference and upper-class disdain has altered over recent years.

    The Art Economy is Self-Deceiving

    The sensitivity, self-deceit and hypocrisy about the connection between aesthetic appreciation and financial value are distinctive to the arts. This comes from the peculiarities of the special economy of high-status luxuries and the quasi-sacred status of items which are also commodities. We love and value art because it seems to stand apart from monetary considerations; the more we love particular examples of art, the more valuable they become as commodities. Knowledge of the value of items makes us uneasy and suspicious of their quality as art. Yet we do not find the enormous value of rare gemstones impairs our aesthetic appreciation of them. A fan of gems would not decide to boycott a display of gemstones because they were too famous and valuable, yet art lovers often are swayed by such considerations. In the art economy so much is paradoxical.

    Abbing notes that denial of economic value (or sabotaging of marketability) is used to maintain/emphasise material’s high-art status, in contrast to low art, which is popular and commercial in nature. Self-abnegating behaviour can drive up the monetary value of an artist’s products. It is not necessarily (or even primarily) a deliberate economic strategy, though it could be used that way; it is most likely the result of scarcity pricing and the market’s craving for iconic “authenticity”. Greater non-marketability > increased perceived authenticity > elevated status > increased demand > increased price. 

    Winners Take All

    The rewards of the arts are not proportionately distributed. If famous Anish Kapoor has 10 exhibitions, less famous Julian Schnabel does not get to 9 exhibitions (equivalent to 90% of Kapoor’s recognition). Schnabel gets maybe 2 exhibitions even though his name recognition is perhaps 90% of Kapoor’s. There is a limit to the number of exhibition slots available. Likewise, magazines and newspapers have a limited capacity to review exhibitions and averagely educated members of the public may recognise the names of only 10 living artists. The difference in recognition between being 9 and 10 on that list is small; the difference between being number 10 and 11 on that list may be huge. Similarly, a graph of all living artists’ income per annum would be flat at zero and near-zero for almost the entire X axis showing the low income of the majority, grow slightly for the small number who make a living income and then reach a sheer wall for the tiny number of super-rich artists. This is a form of winner-take-all situation. 

    Negative as they may seem, winner-takes-all conditions provide opportunity for great fame and income in contrast to the poverty of most practitioners, which in turn adds to the excitement and appeal of being an artist. Artists, especially professional ones, are risk-takers. If unionisation or an income-equalising scheme were proposed, neutral risk calculation suggests a way to equalise income disparity should be in most artists’ best interests. However, human instinct being what it is, most artists would conclude that they are talented and lucky enough to benefit from a win-big economy rather than a share-small one. It is the calculation of every person who ever laid a wager.    

    Artists are Ill-Informed Gamblers

    Abbing posits “more than other professionals, the average artist is inclined to overestimate his or her skills” and “the average artist is less well informed [about his profession] than other professionals”. Considering the way adolescents form an attachment to art (due to emotional rather than pragmatic considerations without even the vaguest of overviews of the career prospects available to artists), it is hardly surprising that future artists are often ignorant of the factors that will determine their likely income and success. In a time when most of the standard aesthetic/skill measurements are no longer indicators of potential success, how can any art student assess his career prospects? In such circumstances, the decision to enter the profession cannot be anything other than a hopeful gamble made by people who consider themselves unfit for “normal” jobs (even though numerous artists actually have second jobs which they perform competently). Artists cleave to a life in the arts not despite the poverty but partly because of poverty which acts as a badge of authenticity and a demonstration of unwillingness to compromise. The lack of reward in a perverse way validates a financially unsuccessful career: it shows how selfless and dedicated an artist has been, when in reality it might just indicate that this artist is no good. Entrants to art schools are also ill-informed about the many hidden, informal and unspoken barriers that exist in the art world, with its web of gatekeepers, conventions, rules and social contacts.  

    I would add that artists think they are more in control of their careers than they actually are. Changing taste, external market conditions and luck are all beyond an individual’s control. 

    Subsidies Create Poverty

    A large number of artists earn nothing at all from their art; in fact a significant number incur overall debts to pay for material costs while failing to sell art (admittedly, some may not be offering art for sale). Artists are much more impoverished today than in previous eras because many function in a market detached from selling. In terms of income from gifts/subsidies (private and public) compared to income from the market, artists rely on the former to a degree unparalleled in any other profession with the exception of the clergy – another example of low-earning professionals being subsidised for the public good. Thus the exceptionality of the art economy is again apparent.  

    The arts is a paradoxical economy because for a long period (at least since 1945) the majority of artists have had low incomes from art; according to economic theory this commonly known information should cause a contraction in the number of people entering the profession, which would lead the overall consumption of art being spread between a smaller number of producers, thereby raising the average income. Yet, clearly, this has never happened. In fact, the reverse: there are evermore art graduates at a time when incomes from art are at an all-time low. Apparently, the social cachet, personal satisfaction and tiny possibility of great wealth outweigh the statistics.  

    Due to the general esteem in which the high arts are held, it is deemed socially beneficial to subsidise art and artists, partly in order to alleviate poverty. This is a contributory factor in establishing and maintaining a web of government support, patronage and material advantage afforded the arts.

    Abbing writes: “The total amount of financial assistance for artists has no effect on artists’ incomes. […] Irrespective of developments in spending, donations, subsidies and social benefits, the incomes of artists have remained relatively low throughout the West for more than a century now, and most pronouncedly since the Second World War. If there is a trend in the second half of the twentieth century, it is a downward one. […] In countries like the Netherlands where there is extensive subsidisation of the arts, the artist’s average income is the same or lower than of artists in countries like the US and England, where subsidisation levels are lower.”

    This conclusion contradicts most received wisdom. “If the sole aim is to reduce poverty in the arts then the best policy is to reduce overall subsidisation of the arts”. That sets aside the issue of the social benefits of subsidisation. The bare figures suggest that if the purpose of government art subsidies is to benefit artists financially, it is not working.   

    The State Encourages the Oversupply of Artists

    The Dutch BKR plan bought art for local government bodies directly from artists as a form of subsidy; it operated between 1949 and 1987. Spending on the plan escalated to unsustainable levels as the number of participating artists grew. When the plan was cancelled, there was a reduction in the number of students applying for fine-art courses, an increase in the number of artists leaving the profession and a cooling effect on the general increase in the number of artists joining the profession. 

    The past restrictions of academic and guild membership – which restricted the number of producers and set certain standards and conditions and kept prices relatively high – no longer apply. Educational artistic qualification in terms of BA and MA degrees is abundant and easily obtained. Government policy is to encourage the provision of ever-wider art education.

    The public subsidisation of the arts – insofar as it reaches artists directly – encourages people to join the art profession and contributes to commercially unsuccessful artists staying in their careers, which artificially sustains a high number of producers and perpetuates the impoverishment of artists in general. Income from the state allows artists to cut back on their second jobs to devote more time to artistic production. Although society as a whole considers sponsorship (direct and indirect) of artists a social benefit, it may actually be harming artists by swelling the production of art there is no market for. Increased state funding increases the number of artists and art production.

    Art Funding Goes to the Middle Class

    The common goal of expanding the reach of the arts to groups which under-consume them is not efficiently met through public subsidy (such as support for artists, venues, ticket discounts, tax relief, etc.). Subsidies tend to disproportionately reach the middle-class white producers and consumers who are already engaged by the arts, thus sustaining the status quo rather than bringing in consumers from other demographic groups. Government arts policy may be explicitly oriented towards social outreach but its effects channel money into the arts consumed by policy administrators and their milieu. 

    The State has Artistic Preferences

    The patronage system of local and central government and public arts bodies replaced the patronage of monarchy, nobility and church; nowadays the arts serve their state patrons in an indirect manner. When a king won a battle he would commission depictions to commemorate his triumph and impress visiting ambassadors; the British Council does not commission propagandist art but it does select art that conforms to certain expectations, which it uses in a form of soft power in its cultural diplomacy. This art indirectly says “Britain is a liberal, tolerant, multi-cultural nation exploding with technical and artistic innovation (and is a great holiday destination and good place to trade with)”. The art is made independently but is often chosen because it conforms to – or at least, does not contradict – the establishment consensus. State-supported art is national and political marketing, directly both domestically and internationally. We could imagine the Arts Council funding a theatre production excoriating white patriarchal hegemony but it would be unthinkable that a White Supremacist play would be subsidised even though the latter might be more artistically provocative, more politically challenging and more in need of financial support. In the arts, “diversity” never means true diversity.

    Without state sponsorship fully staged ballet and opera with live orchestras would likely become extinct, but a reduction in grants which caused the closure of Turner Contemporary, The Baltic and some other venues, would result in Wolfgang Tillmans and Gillian Wearing exhibiting slightly less often. In some areas subsidies keep an entire art form financially viable, in others they promote art which is already self-sustaining or already saturating the market.

    As David Lee has suggested, the Arts Council in itself is not the problem; the problem is the narrowness of the art it perceives as worthy of subsidy and – even within the State Art range – the disproportionate favouritism shown to a handful of practitioners already well supported by commercial galleries and foreign state sponsorship.

    The Amateur-Professional Divide

    There is an important deficiency in Abbing’s analysis, which he admits. What is the status of the amateur-art economy? All manner of visual art material is made, consumed and circulated – and in quantities that far outweigh the traded art in the professional art world – which does not obey the economic rules that apply to professional art. That art is children’s art, hobby and recreational art, copying, private sketching, artefacts from art therapy and other types of art which generally go unexamined through professional channels. Talented amateurs often produce work as good as – or better than – their professional counterparts and are often more risk-averse, financially savvy and better informed than others who have whole-heartedly committed to making art. 

    Abbing makes a distinction between the fine arts and applied arts, noting that the income imbalances, reward range and oversupply of makers in proportion to consumers in the applied-art field is much closer to a normal economy than the singular fine-art economy, an intelligent distinction. Abbing states “in practice the distinction [between amateur and professional] is socially constructed”. Perhaps the emphasis could be not upon the status of the producer but the status of the economic activity. 

    Abbing’s approach does not deal with art that is produced for (relatively) private consumption and which has negligible monetary value. Is this amateur art also part of the same economy as art produced professionally or semi-professionally? Just because material has no measurable financial value, does not mean it has no economic worth; economics embraces non-monetary transactions, as Abbing notes. Amateur art fulfils some of the criteria of (professional) fine art yet also does not fulfil other criteria. Amateur producers are often not professionally trained/qualified, tend to avoid risk, produce erratically, do not seek/receive income for producing, do not need the approval of venues/collectors, do not interact with the public, are ineligible for subsidies, prizes and public gifts, etc. Yet, in purely material terms, amateur producers can produce items identical to those made by professionals, albeit lacking the cachet and monetary value. Abbing suggests that low, amateur and poorly regarded fine art actually has greater aesthetic qualities than high – or what our editor would call “state” – art. High-art producers are marked by their disregard for – or spurning of – aesthetic qualities, whereas low-art producers strive to create beautiful or attractive art involving the use of craft skills.

    The most obvious answer to this conundrum is that the art economy is a spectrum rather than distinct field, with amateur art falling between fine and applied arts (with artists periodically moving between amateur and professional statuses). This raises the difficulty of definition and whether or not Abbing’s fine-art economic criteria apply in a binary fashion or in variable degrees. Abbing’s thesis is that the fine-art economy is distinctly different because of a) the extreme degree of inequality, barriers to entry, the consumption and production, etc. in that field and b) the unique paradigms that apply to that field and not to others. In various ways, amateur art seems to contradict both distinctions of Abbing’s posited economic model.  

    Conclusions

    Abbing seeks to overturn many of our assumptions about the relationship between money and art. This book raises two questions: 1. How true/accurate are Abbing’s conclusions (some of which he admits are in need of further data)? 2. Would interested parties be willing to accept his conclusions? The findings go against many of our common cultural assumptions, vested interests and current socio-economic structures. It is quite possible that Abbing is right on many points – and logic, evidence and intuition suggest that most of the economic observations are correct – but that we simply refuse to accept them or act upon them.

    Do not think that Abbing is pushing a political agenda in favour of free-market capitalism or abandonment of artistic subsidy. Abbing admits that there are many legitimate reasons why the arts are subsidised but he suggests that the many common justifications for art subsidies are spurious. The true reasons for art subsidies are rather too self-interested and elitist to be made plain.

    Why Are Artists Poor? should be required reading for everyone in arts administration and planning, and it is recommended reading for any serious-minded person thinking of becoming an artist. 

  • Alexander Adams: What is Critical Theory and Why Should I Care?

    Alexander Adams

    “Was Lt Columbo’s name really Frank? We’ve all seen the freeze-frame close-ups of Columbo’s ID badge which states that his first name is ‘Frank”. But should we consider this canonical?”

    I’m becoming more and more confused by this ‘canonical’ business. The above is from Columbophile website. I love his joke about the Jewish lady who was walking down the street when she met a flasher. He whipped open his raincoat and she bent down to have a closer look. ‘Huh!’, she said. ‘Call that a lining?’

    At Browse and Darby on Cork Street for a small show of paintings called Off the Radar selected by William Packer. Some of these artists I remember from the Royal College. Leonard Rosoman was supposed to be my personal tutor. He is represented here by a rather good portrait of Jamie Scott. During his time as my tutor he never spoke a word to me. I asked Cyril Reason, another tutor, about this and he explained that Leonard was frightened of me. Jean Cooke I also remember. She was a nice woman but suffered from John Bratby. The only thing I remember her saying is “Ooh mi cystitis is really killing me this morning”. Her picture Up the road and pigeon die is worth a look.

    Deep in the bowels of the Sainsbury wing at the NG is an exhibition of the work of Mantegna and Bellini. The Venetian Bellini was one of the earliest artists to use landscape as an important ingredient of a picture and he did it in a less ‘wooden’ style than heretofore. The Paduan Mantegna was married to Bellini’s sister so they were kind of rivals. Mantegna was rather more formally and classically inclined, best known for his Triumph of Caesar. It’s good to see this series again, and illuminated much better than they were recently at the Royal Academy.

    The Feast of the Gods by Bellini is a good example of the way artists used to collaborate. It was touched up later by Titian, and then Dosso Dossi. The Assassination of St Peter Martyr, which is in the National Gallery, demonstrates the importance landscape held for him, about two thirds of it being taken up by a forest. The Drunkenness of Noah, also by Bellini, shows a near naked Noah sprawled out with three attendant figures. The central one behind him has a facial expression of slavering lechery, similar to that of the chief skinner in Ribera’s St Bartholemew, but more of that later.

    Bellini made a copy of Mantegna’s Presentation of Christ in the Temple. He did it from a tracing. What they did to babies in those days was extraordinary. The baby here being proffered to the priests is wrapped up tightly in white bandages and apart from the head would have been unable to move. It’s a wonder they didn’t gag it for good measure. Is this what’s meant by swaddling? Minerva expelling the vices from the Temple of Virtue by Mantegna is interesting mainly for his depiction of the vices. There’s a wonderful fat one in the bottom right corner.

    The drawings are very interesting, especially Mantegna’s Virtus Combusta. The description of it in the catalogue is delicious: ‘Pen and brown ink and point of the brush on a brown ground, heightened with white, the black background over red on paper.” Poetry. Blindfolded Virtue is being led to a pitfall by sundry malefactors. There are many other beautiful drawings. The Virgin and Child with Angel by Mantegna – tonally exquisite.

    There’s a priest in these parts who wanders around in a floor-length cassock, with a squarish hat and a pimple on top. He’s very furtive looking with a purplish complexion, and terribly thin. An obvious self-flagellant and wearer of the barbed wire garter. I wouldn’t be surprised if he’s got hairy palms. The other day he was bending down to talk to a small boy and I felt like Alfred Hitchcock who, upon witnessing a similar scene, wound down the window of his limo and shouted “Run! Run little boy! Run for your life!”

    “We have seen in our times men sent to the flames or the hangman’s hands on the grounds of their rejecting the holy word of god as the prelates interpret it. These prelates have lifted up their eyes as they were swooning with joy at the salvation of the sinner, though deeply regretting the agony inflicted. They love the pain of others for in it their own power is made manifest. It’s the one thing that man wants. Not knowledge, not virtue, but power.” So wrote Machiavelli. Some of the horrors of the life religious are on display at the Dulwich Picture Gallery in a show of paintings by José Ribera.

    One of the chief horrors (still common in the Middle East) is the strappado. The miscreant has his hands pinioned behind his back and is hoisted by the wrists, sometimes to a great height. Occasionally they would be suddenly jerked down a bit, just for jolly. The arms would steadily assume a vertical position as shoulder dislocation advanced. At what point death would ensue is uncertain. Perhaps they did them a favour and let them drop. Still it was for their own good, to protect them from eternal damnation in the fiery pits.

    Ribera was also preoccupied by the gruesome fate of St Bartholemew, who was flayed alive. There are several versions of this theme but the best is in the first room. Unfortunately it has been covered fairly recently in high-gloss varnish, which renders close scrutiny impossible. You have to stand well back to avoid the glare. There are many ways to varnish a picture and many different varnishes – you can even get a matt one. The one they’ve used here is most unfortunate. But it is a great picture.

    The chief skinner is shown sharpening his tool with a look of enormous relish, almost lechery, and this motif recurs in all the other versions. Most of the pictures in this show are to do with inflicting pain. St Peter was crucified upside down and Ribera went to great lengths to figure out how this was achieved. Not easy. The base of the cross is notched and morticed to allow the passage of the ropes attached to the ankles of the unworthy saint before he was hauled up and planted head down. It looks like his head would have been fairly close to the ground so bystanders must have been tempted to give him a good kicking, or maybe not as this would have shortened the agony.

    Writing about pictures with such enormously powerful subject matter is a difficult business. I suppose you can consider Caravaggio in aesthetic or compositional terms, but not these. And for a religious person they must be something else altogether; they are after all devotional items. Perhaps to get inside Ribera you have to go to the drawings, many of which are on display here. It seems clear that the sadistic tendency was there all along, it was inherent in Ribera’s make-up and he managed to harness it to religiosity.

    Regular readers will be aware of my friend Mistress Trish, who runs a dungeon down in Warren Street. It might be a good idea to take her along to Dulwich to give her a few new ideas. She’s got a houseboat and one of her clients has been enquiring about keelhauling. I advised her against it, for that way madness lies … and quite a bit of trouble. I recommended she stick with walking the plank.

    Like the universe the cosmic conceit of the art trade is expanding forever. Some of us thought that the gravity of logic or aesthetic sensibility would somehow cause it to slow down and contract, but no such luck. There must be some weird dark matter involved. The joke persists, as can be seen at Tate Bankside.

    “I’ve suffered for my art, and now it’s your turn!” could well be the motto of the artist responsible for the new display in the Boiler Room. There’s absolutely nothing in it until you get to the bottom of the ramp. There, gangs of schoolchildren are cavorting on the floor, which has been laid with some sort of heat sensitive tiles reacting to foot or body pressure, leaving a mark behind. Off to one side is a smallish room to which you are admitted after having your hand stamped with a long number. Inside it’s like a Turkish bath but the steam is something akin to a mixture of menthol eucalyptus vapour which promotes the tears you should shed for the plight of refugees. I felt like erecting a large sign reading “Art is not Elastoplast”.

    Oh, just one more thing. I popped into the National Portrait Gallery to see the BP prize. A little man told me it had finished the previous week. “You’ll have to go to Wolverhampton,” he quipped.

  • Alexander Adams: The Road to Reparation – May 2018

    Alexander Adams
    May/June 2018

    The Road to Reparation – The Restitution Question

    This essay will discuss reparations. The definitions of “restitution” and “reparations” used in this essay are as follows: restitution is the return of specific unlawfully acquired goods to the lawfully determined owner or descendants (or estate) thereof; reparations are the return of goods or payment of compensation by one state to another, punitive in basis, regardless of how legal the acquisition was. I do believe in the correctness of restitution of property stolen in the recent past and for which there is a provable provenance. Likewise, objects illegally acquired by looting or illegal excavation must be returned to the country of origin if there is some certainty about the point of origin, when the acquisition is recent. However, this essay will argue against reparations on the grounds of cultural inequity. Items assigned new owners will not be called “returned” because (as discussed below) many of them will not be going back to rightful beneficiaries; these items will be described as “reparated”. Advocates will be called “reparationists”.

    Recent disputes – and those which would emerge en masse if repatriation of artefacts were to become widespread – are closer to reparation rather than restitution, as the exact legality of the original acquisition is considered largely irrelevant by the claimants and campaigners, so this essay dwells of reparation. Additionally, restitution is widely accepted in legal and social terms and though there are fringe cases that are contentious, the principle seems just. The case for reparations is quite the contrary.

    Moral Victories over the Dead

    In November 2017, President Macron of France announced the return of artefacts from a French public collection to Burkina Faso. This was lauded in an article titled “The restitution revolution begins”. Note the triumphant activist tenor of the author, a professor of art history in Paris and Berlin universities.

    There are some apparently reasonable grounds in favour of reparations: some cultural goods and human remains were taken from a people or territory without consent of the occupants; some artefacts were bought under duress or without fair compensation; and some artefacts were grievous losses to the communities which prized them for symbolic or religious reasons.

    The claims for reparations are made by aggrieved groups, foreign states and anti-colonialists, especially Leftists. The motivations are not as straightforward as they seem. It is not merely that artefact X is important to a non-Western culture and unfairly gained. For example (as we shall see below), the artefact is often not important to the claimant and was not gained unfairly. We must understand that reparations are symbolic victories over long-gone colonists, states and social attitudes by activists seeking emotional gratification. Specificities undermine the idea that any particular act of reparation is clear and just because the truth (legal and factual) is murky and not always in favour of the claimant. The truth does not matter to reparationists because reparation is a moral contest between today and yesterday. Each act of reparation is an act of courageous revenge upon an opponent that is dead and mute. As long as we understand this, we can comprehend why the drawbacks of reparations do not deflect reparationists.

    Reparations are a form of retroactive historical justice. Another example is the recent mass pardoning of soldiers from the Great War executed for desertion. It is reasonable to criticise the executions and wish that psychiatric medicine had been more advanced than it was. It is unreasonable to presume to apply standards of our era to actions of a long-past era. We assume that we would have acted differently in their place and that we can judge on a subject of which we know little set in a world of which we know less. Retroactive justice is founded upon monstrous hubris and vast ignorance. Retroactive justice is indicative of overweening vanity and a dearth of self-knowledge. The way to address previous perceived injustices that are beyond the reach of current legal resolution is to conduct our lives and shape our laws to prevent future injustices. The dwelling upon historical injustice is one of the core tenets of ideological extremists who loathe the status quo.

    Reparationists fixate upon symbolic repatriation of objects because it looks easy. As we will see, reparations are as entangled, intractable and impossible to resolve as any aspect of historical justice.     

    Deaccessioning Leads to Reparations

    This summer Deaccessioning and Its Discontents: A Critical History by Martin Gammon will be published. In this book (which I hope to review in full), the case will be made for deaccessioning as a financial necessity for museums. One of the principle problems with deaccessioning is that it will breach the golden rule that museums do not deaccession items, something almost universally observed by British museums. If it becomes possible and increasingly common for museums to deaccession, we would see an immediate intensification of claims upon non-Western artefacts in Western museums. The pressure of anti-colonialist activists will increase against administrators and politicians who do not seem confident in the value of the Western civilisation. Presidents such as Macron will give away artefacts for a favourable headline. Politicians could hardly be bought more cheaply.

    Deaccessioning would allow social activists to dispose of art they think should not be owned by public institutions: some non-Western historical objects (including human remains), nudes, hunting art, art donated by slave owners and a dozen other categories. If you think this is an exaggeration, consider what is commonly discussed in universities to glimpse the mindset of the next generation of curators and museum directors. For example, here is an abstract of a published paper from 2012: “Anarchist and militant forms of social movement research serve as a starting point for theorizing ethically oriented and embedded social movement research, and theoretical connections with Gramsci’s notion of the organic intellectual are set out. These positions are brought into conversation with an anti-colonial paradigm that recognizes colonialism as a continuing process of imposed and dominating relationships that needs to be both critiqued and resisted in theoretical and activist spaces. This makes it possible to articulate an ethical conception of (militant) activist research with an anti-colonial orientation.” Does any reader think that if such individuals had power in an era when deaccessioning were possible that they would not enact extensive reparations?

    Gradations of Duress

    If reparations are not to be arbitrary, there must be an effort to judge the legality of acquisition. A core tenet of reparationists is that any transaction between colonial power and subject is inherently unequal. According to a Marxist analysis, there is a fundamental division in power between coloniser and colonised; resultant economic systems are weighted in favour of colonisers. To the anti-colonialist, the system of empire is coercive and therefore the basis of colonisation is illegitimate. Therefore any transaction which has legal sanction is not only unfairly weighted through its institutional, legal and economic disparities, it is actually illegal. This is not a position derived from actual analyses of situations but a goal-determined attack on colonialism. It is post hoc justification for an emotional position and is not a legal assessment.

    Western colonisation was only one stage in a series of invasions. Colonies previously enslaved neighbouring territories and confiscated chattels. Anti-colonialists frequently overlook the invasion and colonisation by non-Western powers such as the Han, Mongols, Ottoman and so forth. Many of the items acquired from colonies were booty of that colony’s own colonial imperialism. Anti-colonialism as an ideology (as we know it in the West) is not actually anti-colonialism; it is an analogue to Marxist anti-Western anti-capitalism.   

    If unfavourable trading situations, restrictions resulting from artificial exchange rates, proscriptive property laws and a number of other examples of disparity in trade law delegitimise transactions then almost every historical transaction becomes suspect, regardless of colonialism. How can we assess the correctness of a valuation or exchange rate in a distant historical period? We might consider the trading of a totem pole for a couple of axe heads to be unfair, yet the tribe may have considered the transaction very favourable to them. Perhaps the tribe took pride in having something of theirs taken to a foreign land to be venerated. Totem poles were traditionally left to decay to nothing. The only 19th-century totem poles in existence are those that were acquired by colonists, who preserved them from erosion. Who are we to speak on behalf of those other groups? Is that not simply another form of colonial presumptuousness? Likewise, what legitimacy do claimants today have to speak on behalf of the dead? Reparations will lead to claimants portraying fair acquisitions as cultural theft in order to gain material advantage. 

    Gradations of duress are essentially arbitrary. The lines we draw accord to our political outlooks and practical goals rather than being determined by ethical principles or legal precedent.

    Reparations are Arbitrary Justice 

    One of the core tenets of reparations is that the original owner of the object should have the benefits of ownership. How is that to be determined when the society, state or people have undergone radical change, been divided or disappeared? The recipient people or state may not be the same. There may be rival claimants. Reparation may not correct injustice but only vary the injustice because justice – in any meaningful sense – may be impossible.

    Consider the fictional case of a stone lion in the British Museum. It was commissioned by a Hittite tyrant. He conquered a neighbouring tribe and used their treasure to pay for the carving of sculptures to commemorate his victory. The lion sculpture was lost then later unearthed by the Greeks and taken to Byzantium. Byzantium was conquered by the Ottomans. In the late eighteenth century an English duke purchased the lion illegally from an official at the museum in Istanbul. The lion was taken to the duke’s estate in England and eventually donated by his descendants to the British Museum. To whom does this lion rightfully belong? The British Museum, the museum in Istanbul, the regional government of Anatolia, the Greek state, the descendants of the Hittite king or the descendants of the defeated tribe? Exactly how far back is this moral accounting to go? One suspects it will go back only as far as is convenient. In other words, the beneficiary will ultimately be arbitrary. At this point, any assertion that reparations are moral recompense for the benefit of wronged parties becomes the obvious absurdity it always was. In retrospect, justice of our age will be understood as limited as that of past ages.

    Reparations Fuel Corruption

    Any reparated objects would become the inalienable property of states or museums, which could legally sell the artefacts. This undermines the idea that reparations mean the returning of objects to the societies that previously owned them. Reparations might not lead to people of the recipient state having access to reparated artefacts. The people might not even benefit from proceeds of the sale of reparated artefacts. Many former colonies in the developing world have a serious problem with corruption. That is not to assert that corruption is not present in Western countries but it is widely disapproved of and legislated against here. Government ministers and museum directors in the West cannot legally personally benefit in material fashion from sale of items in public ownership.

    Reparations are considered ethical but they would fund the unethical practices such as corruption. The effects of reparations would be to swell the bank accounts of dictators and support their police states. Reparations would deepen rather than alleviate the problems of recipient countries. Reparations allows reparationists to salve their consciences and dictators of former colonies to enrich themselves, while their people get nothing and centres of learning lose the core of their scholarship. The argument is not that we have a duty to interfere within any other state but that we have to consider the ethical consequences of reparations.

    Reparations are Ineffective

    Reparations will never be enough, because emotional hurt will be sustained for political advantage. Every political ideology has its own simplified narrative, with villains, heroes and shared aims. Reparations will feed into those narratives and artefacts will become cultural prizes, like flags to be captured in a board game. Rather than healing divisions, reparations will lead to endless struggle nurtured by politicians and activists.

    Reparations will incentivise misrepresentation of history. Rival states will compete for reparation of the same object, claiming to represent the descendants of the colonial territory. Museums and scholars will distort facts in order to support a legal case. Courts will have to decide between multiple interpretations of disputed research. States will divvy up spoils in bargaining processes divorced from notional justice. Far from rectifying injustice, reparations will multiply injustices.

    Reparations will fuel social activism in the culture wars. In an age when many curators have little faith in the importance of their institutions and the value of Western civilisation, who will resist social pressure with rational and principled argument? People on social media will swarm from one petition to another, seeking to strike against bastions of imperialism and restore artefacts to ancient noble societies. In reality, it is the gamification of cultural policy masquerading as justice. Individuals will click on a button to receive a jot of pleasure, follow their nomination, gain pleasure when their nomination is reparated or experience indignation when their nomination is rejected, all the time not understanding anything of the history of – or fate of – the object. These people are not campaigners for justice; they are mice in a maze following a trail of micro-rewards. 

    The effect of reparations will be an endless series of one-sentence summaries of colonial history bandied around by ill-informed opinionated individuals within an apathetic population, weakly opposed by demoralised historians. The actual fate of the artefacts – possibly to be sold to enrich corrupt officials or fund a dictator’s police state – is not something to be dwelt on.

    Welfare of Artefacts & Scholarship

    The reason many Chinese visitors come to the British Museum is because much of China’s history was liquidated in the Cultural Revolution. Europe and North America have been relatively safe for portable treasures. Western museums are determined to protect and research artefacts from all cultures. We do not make a habit of destroying, suppressing or deaccessioning artefacts – at least while Identarians are kept at bay. This is not the case in societies where deeply entrenched enmities and political issues lead to the destruction of objects and the distortion of science by the parties which have custodianship of artefacts. 

    Centres of learning have developed, typified by the university museum, where students and scholars can develop knowledge through direct contact with artefacts and devise new scientific processes which allow conservation and non-invasive analysis. This means that objects are cared for nowhere better than in Western museums, extending their existence and benefitting civilisation at large. Through the transfer of ownership the train of knowledge is broken. We lose the insights that derive from centres of learning which further the science through incremental yearly research. Western institutions make research available through publication and internet access. Western institutions make world culture accessible to the world’s population.

    Consider the conservation of items. In Saudi Arabia, the dominant Wahhabi sect has destroyed many historical buildings connected to the life of Mohammed because of the potential idolatrous veneration of important earthly objects. If a reparation judgment assigned an artefact to an owner which we could expect to destroy that object, would the current holder be obliged to send that artefact to its destruction? That is an extreme case, but what about those countries that engage in harmful practices such as the overpainting or destructive alteration of artefacts to restore them? (The issue of our own museums engaging in such practices is ably covered by the ArtWatch organisation.) What about those museums in developing countries which are not able to sufficiently protect items by using dehumidifiers, dim lighting and anti-pest measures? In many cases, if the welfare of artefacts is the priority then Western museums are the safest places for them to reside.

    Conclusion

    To summarise the case against reparations: objects are safest and most accessible in Western museums; objects are best analysed by Western institutions; reparations will unfairly benefit many recipients; reparations will fuel politicking, sectarian division, international disputes, corruption and theft; reparated objects will not necessarily benefit the countries or populations they are given to; the implementation of reparations will damage objects; once started, reparations is a process that will be continuous and expensive, with irreversible results; any reparation process will be impossible to administer fairly and will be subject to counter litigation; reparations will not provide satisfaction.

    Reparation is a process which implies that property – and by extension, the experience of appreciating that property and interacting with its culture of origin – is under the control of a national, sectarian or tribal group which has a claim to authority over that property in perpetuity. This entrenches the Identarian position – that experiences of peoples are discrete and that humanity is a divided population.

    While my previous arguments against Identarian positions of quota programming, suppression of free speech and so forth have had strong and explicable ethical foundations, this argument against reparation relies on pragmatism. It rests on the basis that reparations are impractical, unworkable and unfair rather than unethical per se. Again, like tacit support for “diverse representation” and “affirmative action”, the case for reparations is an extreme position supported by well-meaning moderate people who have not thought through the implications. How can diverse representation be an “extreme position”? The extreme position of identity politics is that people should be classified by surface characteristics and treated collectively rather than judged on personal merit. The underlying idea is dehumanising. The extreme position of reparations is that history should be retroactively engineered to provide us with emotional gratification. The underlying idea is repugnant.

    People who are in favour of the concept of reparations should consider if these are the principles deserving of their support.

  • Laura Gascoigne: The Art Police – November 2017

    If you’re thinking of committing an art crime, now’s your moment. In June budgetary pressures forced the ‘temporary’ closure of the Met’s Art & Antiques Squad and the transfer of expert staff to the Grenfell Tower fire investigation, and there’s no knowing when, if ever, they’ll be back. So it’s bye-bye blue light, hello green light to thieves, fakers, fraudsters and traffickers of looted antiquities who fund the terrorism the rest of the Met is struggling to combat.

    But it’s not the end of art policing; while the official force has been disbanded, unofficial forces are taking over. Alexander Adams’ article New Order in the last issue was a cogent analysis of how the enforcers of the new identity politics are effectively policing public exhibitions. Since his report there have been further developments in the case of the Dakota Elders v Sam Durant, whose sculpture Scaffold was removed from Minneapolis Sculpture Garden after complaints that as a non-Native American he had no hereditary right to refer in his work to the hanging of 38 Dakota Indians by the US Army in 1862. Initially condemned to be burnt, the dismantled Scaffold will now be buried in a secret location. Meanwhile poor old Jimmie Durham, who has spent a lifetime trading on his Native American ancestry, has been denounced by a group of snooty Cherokees as a fake for not being a registered member of the Cherokee Nation. Once an art degree was qualification enough to practise art; now you need registration with your tribe or ‘subset’.

    On this basis, only pure-breed something-or-others should be allowed to make public statements, artistic or otherwise, on questions of race. As a half-Italian, quarter-white-West Indian, quarter-Northern-Irish crossbreed I would probably be wise to keep my trap shut but I’m congenitally incapable, so here goes. First off, I would like to point out to these purblind purists a perennial problem with questions of heredity. Who among us can actually prove our bloodlines? Which of us really knows who our fathers/grandfathers/great-grandfathers were? Only our mothers/grandmothers/great-grandmothers could tell us. Are we going to dig all our ancestors up and DNA-test them before presuming to make art about them?

    Racial purity is not the only thorny issue in a field where so many subsets disadvantaged in terms of gender, transgender, whatever – it can’t be long before the LGBT contingent have commandeered all the letters in the alphabet – have axes to grind. For the moment different factions are content to share the benefits of affirmative action with other ‘minorities’. (Don’t you love it when women get classed as a minority?) But believe me, they’ll soon be scrapping like ferrets in a sack over the dismembered body of White Male Art.

    Of course it’s true that WMAs have had it all their own way for far too long and, yes Guerilla Girls, if women don’t have to be naked to get into the Met, that’s progress. But can positive discrimination in the present reverse the injustices of the past? Nearly all the art preserved in our museums was painted, carved or moulded by men for men, a historical fact that retrospective action cannot change. Maria Balshaw has been making appropriate noises about adjusting the historical gender balance in the Tate Modern by acquiring a Frida Kahlo – an expensive price to pay for a minor tweak – while in Tate Modern’s contemporary displays Frances Morris has already established parity between the male and female artists represented. For the moment, the reach of the levellers has not extended beyond contemporary art, a few misbegotten historical statues excepted. That’s a can of worms I won’t open here, except to agree with Lionel Shriver’s recent observation in the Spectator: “Applying today’s demanding standards of rectitude to previous generations – requiring all past notables to have embraced racial equality, feminism, disability rights, anti-colonialism, non-smoking and gender-fluidity means pulling down virtually every statue standing.” (I would also like to plead that if male memorials are to be replaced with female ones, can they please not be ‘sculpted’ by Gillian Wearing.)

    What started me on this subject was being asked to write about two historical male artists who were lamentably far from meeting Shriver’s criteria. First Ernst Haeckel, the 19th century German biologist and illustrator whose breathtaking watercolours of marine invertebrates helped to launch Art Nouveau and are the subject of a new book from Taschen. Haeckel’s paintings were astonishingly beautiful but his views on race were shockingly objectionable. Should we allow this knowledge to cloud our appreciation of his art?

    Second Amedeo Modigliani, the subject of Tate Modern’s blockbuster winter exhibition. The problems the Guerrilla Girls may have with his nudes are the least of it. This was a man who threw one of his muses, Beatrice Hastings, through a window and dragged another, Jeanne Hébuterne, by her plaits (a fate avoided by the gamine Hastings, who had short hair). Think about it: a known abuser of women given star billing at an institution that claims to be levelling the gender field. Here we have ‘the most popular modern art museum in the world’ virtue-signalling with one hand while virtual pussy-grabbing with the other. Does its right hand not know what its left hand is doing? No, not while its left hand is counting the takings, because it’s blockbuster exhibitions like this that fund the virtue-signalling.

    How long before the identarian art police wise up to this fact and start picketing non-compliant exhibitions of historical art? True, they’d need armies of pickets because there are almost no historical WMAs in the top rank of crowd-pullers who are without sin, and some are offenders on multiple counts. Take Gauguin, the subject of Tate Modern’s moneymaking blockbuster of autumn 2010. Child abuse: check. Cultural appropriation: check. Passing on the clap to healthy young women: let’s not go there.

    The difficulty here is that art is funky. If the Tate examined its conscience it would have to confess that misbehaviour adds to an artist’s appeal. How else did the bad boys and girls of Britart awaken public interest in the Turner Prize? Since the subset-appeasers took over running the show, it’s become so boring it has had to be exiled to Hull. Sooner or later our publicly funded galleries are going to have to face up to this conflict of interest because, as night follows day, where positive discrimination leads negative follows.

    Art has a long and venerable tradition of pretending to serve morality while undermining it; our Victorian ancestors led the world in double standards and we should learn from them before it’s too late. Step one in confronting censorship is to separate the art maker from the art. To quote Liz Taylor, who had experience in these matters: “The problem with people who have no vices is that generally you can be pretty sure that they’re going to have some pretty annoying virtues.” Virtuous people need to be kept away from art, from its production and, ideally, from its management. With the exception of a few monochrome canvases, art has never been whiter than white. Should galleries be ‘safe spaces’? Hell no! Virtue-signalling holds up a false mirror to the messy reality art is supposed to reflect. In the immortal words of the love-struck millionaire to the gender-fluid Jack Lemmon in Some Like It Hot: “Nobody’s perfect”.

    Laura Gascoigne
    The Jackdaw Nov/Dec 2017

  • Editorial – July 2017

    WHOLESALE GRATIFICATION 

    In the last issue I noted the gradual but relentless erosion of space allocated to historical pictures in Tate Britain. This contraction will now accelerate because the collection is to be re-hung, yet again, on this occasion thematically – a policy undoubtedly designed to demonstrate the State Art Commandment that all roads shall lead to the Usual Suspects. Long gone are the reassuring days of my youth when a regular visitor to Millbank would know exactly where to find the enduring gems of British art. This trend of squeezing the historical is also inevitable because new art increases as a percentage of the collection. Hedging their bets, and in order not to miss something the future decides is important, the Tate now acquires anything by anyone. To them the idea of exhibiting discernment is as damningly reactionary as the idea of figurative art itself. The result is that Serota’s true legacy is not really all those expensive new buildings and extensions but his total surrender to mediocrity.

    A well-researched article on the Guardian website recently arrived at the startling, though not entirely surprising conclusion that during Serota’s recently concluded 28-year tenure the number of works in the Tate’s holding – excluding the Turner Bequest – doubled. Serota added over 30,000 new items, the majority of them box fresh. We’ve pointed out previously in these pages that the Tate’s stock has grown every two years by more works than the National Gallery has acquired in total in the 193 years of its existence. The irony here is that this massive growth, both of the collection and the galleries in which to house some of it, has taken place during a period when scarcely a month passed without warnings of dire consequences if more public subsidy wasn’t found. On the evidence of the collection alone, and for all Serota’s gloomy predictions to the contrary, the Tate has enjoyed a golden age of expansion during which it swallowed far more than its fair share of the national arts budget.

    Most of the work acquired during the Serota years is by a roll call of artists you’ve never heard of, many of whom are not only living but young, and whose efforts wouldn’t have merited preservation in what at least in theory, until Serota took over, had always been a repository for choice works of proven quality. Not any more. Today, the collection is home to the kind of instantly forgettable trivia we see in Tate Modern’s latest extension.

    Serota’s reign was also responsible for a serious reorientation in the way we must approach art. State-approved styles and mediums now require a different way of looking. Established criteria of judgement were replaced by a new ‘vision’ discouraging of knowledge and preconceptions. Dinosaurs, such as myself, who were trained in stylistic comparisons and the identification and explanation of minute visual subtleties, have been mystified by this, confounded by the obvious feebleness of what is relentlessly marketed as the acme of achievement. It took me longer than it ought to have done to realise that if you start with any assumptions at all about what the Arts Council dubs ‘Challenging Contemporary Art’ you are certain to be disappointed. Even the lowest demands will lead to bewilderment. Another of Serota’s legacies is, therefore, that in looking at contemporary art we must all start with no expectations whatsoever, and, what is more, from the furthest extremity of ignorance and credulity. Only then might we not be disappointed, for in these Year-Zero days even the equivalent of a baby spluttering to communicate can be sold as progress.

    As Alexander Adams points out in his thoughtful review concerning the material poverty of many artists (see page 8), the probability of low incomes has not, as one might have predicted, caused a reduction in numbers. Far from it. Students have been sold the pup that anyone can do it with the result that a massive surplus is being produced, too little is worth the time spent looking at it, and too much that is self-evidently stillborn is speculatively hoarded by national institutions.

    Generally, Serota’s legacy is a beautifully polished reflection of his age, in so far as it was one of unsustainable, undiscriminating acquisitiveness. Our population was addicted – a serious sickness – to shopping, fashion, momentary gratification and the instantly obsolete, and so was Serota. And just as ‘Austerity Chancellor’ Osborne borrowed more money than all his predecessors since Robert Walpole combined, so Serota acquired more stuff than all the previous seven Tate directors put together.

    David Lee
    The Jackdaw Jul/Aug 2017

  • Freedom of expression

    freedom of speech

     

    ALEXANDER ADAMS rehearses recent arguments concerning freedom of expression before arriving at his own conclusion.

     

    “One person with a belief is equal to a force of 99 who have only interests.”

    JOHN STUART MILL

     

     

     

    On February 14th, 2015 an Islamist gunman attacked a café in Copenhagen where a debate on free speech was being held. Speaking at the meeting was Swedish artist Lars Vilks, who had been issued with death threats because in 2007 he drew cartoons of the prophet Mohammed that were considered insulting by some Muslims (and some non-Muslims). Vilks was unhurt but a documentary filmmaker Finn Nørgaard was killed. A month earlier, Islamists murdered cartoonists at Charlie Hebdo in Paris. On one level, the Danish attack was prosaically ineffective. The attacker could not gain entry to the building so he sprayed bullets through a glass door. On another level, it marks a new standard, where anyone associating with “insulters of the prophet” can expect to be a target for extremists.

    The cartoons of Vilks and Charlie Hebdo will not be discussed. That has been done elsewhere. We should, perhaps, evaluate what recent assaults on controversial art and satirical journalism – and the assaults yet to come – will mean for arts in the West. It is worth considering how Islamists – some of them born and raised in wholly (or largely) secular European countries – have rejected Western values but have also absorbed aspects of secular culture. This essay cannot be a full account. Though arguments and positions here are simplified, they are not – hopefully – misrepresented. Footnotes have been kept to a minimum, omitting many news sources and much background material.

    Here, “Islamism” is used to refer to “the assertive application of Islamic principles to political and social spheres” as differentiated from Islam practiced as a private ethical code; “extremist” is a personal will to use violence and the threat of violence to achieve his aims; “post-liberal” (1) is used as an adjective to describe the uneasy consensus between mainstream socio-political strands in Western societies, one which accommodates identity politics and encourages constraints on speech, voluntary and otherwise.

    Civility and Censorship

    In recent weeks a common refrain of many commentators and journalists has been “The murder of the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists was wrong but…”. Many felt that cartoonists who had freedom to ridicule Mohammed should not have exercised that right. The inference is that freedom to be irresponsible is not freedom from consequences of irresponsibility. Some of the cartoons were puerile and juvenile but there is plenty of material in that class; public lavatory walls and Internet websites are full of it. The difference is that the cartoons had authors’ names attached and there was a particular address where they could be found.

    It seems that today people who deliberately set out to insult Islam can expect reprisals. Although there is a case to put that we should protect reckless individuals as a matter of principle – and this essay will not argue against that – it is more important that we consider the murders as (at least partly) an extreme manifestation of the climate of accommodation that already compromises our liberty and affects us as citizens, readers and makers of art.

    As we have seen in the pages of arts journals (notably The Jackdaw and The Art Newspaper) and on the website Spiked, the practice of pre-emptive censorship has become an ever-present reality. Nowadays, institutions do not react to criticism but anticipate it. Formerly (in what we must now consider a brief post-War heyday), we relied on institutions to promote and protect difficult art. Institutions introduced new stimulating art and would defend it. Difficult art would at least be shown, allowing us to judge for ourselves. Now institutions fight shy of presenting anything which might cause “community tension”. What has happened to John Latham’s collage of Bible, Talmud and Koran   (2) owned by the Tate? Will it ever go on public display?

    What goes undiscussed is the self-censorship which occurs daily in the lives of satirists, artists and writers. We have all held our tongues in everyday life when we thought speaking out would cause more harm than it would do good. In some respects that is human nature – the desire to avoid conflict and let sleeping dogs lie. When standing up for one’s ideas involves placing others in harm’s way, one naturally grows more tentative. Where you might risk your own safety, you often find you cannot risk that of your family and colleagues. This is something everyone from school bullies to mafia godfathers understand. If intimidators intend to become martyrs, and there is no certain way to protect the lives of you and those dear to you, speech seems impossibly dangerous – which is the calculated effect. Though – in at least some cases – isn’t the protecting-my-colleagues/family defence (albeit a legitimate one) actually a way of excusing oneself from taking an unpopular stand?

    One problem with the on-their-heads-be-it reasoning is that it implicitly accepts that violent retaliation to an actual (or perceived) slight is regrettable but inevitable. Does that line of reasoning also apply if militant Jews were to firebomb publishers of the Koran or radical socialists were to murder BNP members? Doesn’t such reasoning, however indirectly, excuse intimidation and vengeance by any self-identifying group of victims against their putative insulters? Are Muslims not to be held to the same standards as the society they are a part of? (3) Are we to consider Muslims incapable of exercising self-restraint or obeying state laws? On-their-heads-be-it reasoning implies Muslims are less in control of their emotions than non-Muslims and have a tendency to react with violence in response to provocation. This sounds similar to patronising colonialist stereotypes about “savage natives” and “inferior races”. Yet this special pleading – that outsiders can never understand the members or culture of a subset, something which renders that culture unknowable and beyond universal principles – is very much a part of identity politics which robs individuals of autonomy, turning them into puppets of social conditions and hereditary circumstance.

    Another problem with pre-emptive censorship for protection is that it is effectively impossible. The Charlie Hebdo cartoonists knew they were creating provocative images and could expect a backlash. Consider the case of Salman Rushdie; his The Satanic Verses is a work of literary fiction. The novel included references to Mohammed dreamed by a fictional character in a delirium. The novel led to a fatwa being issued against its author and subsequent attacks against publishers and the murder of a Japanese translator. Rushdie and his colleagues had no reason to expect that instances of blasphemous delirium in a work of fiction might provoke violent hostility. Due-caution caveats cannot be applied in practice as there is no way of predicting how any work of fiction or art touching on Islam may be represented or misrepresented by extremists. The only way to be safe from extremists is to never say anything that touches upon religious culture, never associate with anyone who has and never be in the vicinity of an exploding bomb.

    But even that position will not hold.

    Even if you avoid opposing extremists, restrictions they force on others will affect you. Furthermore, accommodation will not work because Islamist demands will never end. Even if another image of Mohammed is never exhibited or published in the UK again, extremist pressure will continue, applied in other areas of the arts. Images seen as denigrating Muslims (especially Muslim women) will be targeted; “disrespectful” art by artists of Muslim heritage will be threatened; artists who take an avowedly atheist stance will be subject to violent protest. There is no way of following “rules of safe speech” because extremists make rules arbitrarily, opportunistically and unilaterally (4). What may be halal today may tomorrow be retrospectively considered haram (5) with no possibility of reasoned appeal.

    To understand demands and expectations of Islamism as a political movement we must examine the psychology of the extremist.

    The Psychology of Extremism

    For the pious man, religious teaching gives a feeling of superiority through wisdom; ritual gives his life structure; repetition brings comfort and order; moral injunctions give him an ethical framework. He observes dietary restrictions, prays at the prescribed times using exactly the wording necessary. He is fastidious about cleaning, fasting and the way he dresses. Infraction causes him to experience guilt and shame. An extremist is a pious man driven by anger, often prompted by injustice. He is angry at society for failing to be sufficiently pious; he is angry at himself for failing to meet impossible standards of thought and deed; most of all, he is angry at constraints which prevent him from remaking the entire world in the mirror image of the ideal world in his head. Even should he perfect himself – which is never possible – it is the imperfection of those around him which antagonises him most. He cannot bear to exist surrounded by lack of belief and observance. For the Muslim, his religion urges him to jihad – a struggle to change the world around him. In an extremist’s case, he chooses not to perform acts of charity but to combat impiety through any means available to him.

    Whereas a moderately (or even very) religious person can live in relative contentment in a secular society, an extremist never can. The extremist cannot avert his gaze. Religious extremists cannot be accommodated within a secular society by way of reasonable concessions because religious extremism is essentially unreasonable in that it rests on belief not reason. A religious extremist can never be satisfied because he lives a perpetual state of discontent and anger. He encounters obstacles in the form of co-religionists who do not follow his outlook and in secular laws and values which fail to recognise divine truth. He takes pride in being more dissatisfied than his co-religionists, whom he considers complacent. A religious extremist’s struggle is unending because there will always be ways in which the world falls short of the ideal. Hence the religious extremist will never be checked by practical concessions because his aspirations are nothing less than complete obedience to holy laws.

    Enabled by the fiat of imams and encouraged by fellow jihadists, the extreme Islamist becomes so dissociated from the social norms that he ceases to recognise the legitimacy of any restraint other than his own beliefs. The extremist is capable of astounding brutality, avenging a catalogue of injustices which have humiliated him. He becomes desensitised to violence, even relishes committing atrocities in order to lose his humanity and, driven to ecstasy, he becomes a holy instrument of God. An extremist defines his existence by being at the extreme of his society. If he lived in an Islamic theocracy, he would be the enforcer of religious observance; he would volunteer to be an executioner. His devotion can only be proved by the extremities he can endure and which he can impose on others.

    Compared to the executions in ISIS territory, the dispatching of a few cartoonists is a very small matter to Islamists. The Islamist admits no responsibility for the violence – it is the actions of the blasphemer which prompted the inevitable vengeance and if innocent blood is spilled then that is the fault of the transgressor.

    How can such an apparently alien outlook find any succour in secular Western society? To understand how an extremist can be nurtured by a schismatic environment – part Muslim immigrant culture, part secular European – we have to consider the way social discourse in modern Britain changed in the 1970s and 1980s.

    Identity Politics

    Identity politics came to prominence in the late 1960s as a response to the failure in the West of agitation by the political left for fundamental social and economic reform. The disillusionment with the ideology and Marxist economic analysis of the Old Left – particularly after the failed protests of 1968 and in the light of increasingly militant civil-rights and gay-rights movements – gave birth to the New Left. The New Left asserted that – contrary to the Old Left principles of Universality extolled by the Enlightenment, which held that inalienable rights sprang from shared humanity and that one made allegiances by choosing a political stance rather than conforming to oppressive and debilitating division along national, gender and religious lines – rights reform relating to sub-groups could be a more effective means to drive social change (6).

    From this point on, social conventions began to change in ways that have been accepted even by the political right. People are increasingly evaluated as constituents of subset classification by race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, disability and sexuality. Social constraints that were loathed by the Universalist Old Left are fetishized by the factionalist New Left. Certain subsets are resented by the right, other subsets resented by the left but what neither side does is question the validity of identity politics, merely the value of advantaged/disadvantaged groups and which factional interests should be resisted/promoted.

    Crucially, these determining labels are matters over which individuals have little or no agency. Humanity is no longer seen as a uniting quality; the worth of an individual was measured by the assumed privilege or disadvantage of his or her subset(s). When individuals’ worth is measured by their birth subsets, individuals become essentially passive. He/she no longer gains respect and authority through education, skills, building relationships and contributing to society. Identity politics is exactly the opposite of empowerment – it infantilises by reducing individuals to passive victims in need of protection. Individuals are encouraged to reduce themselves to sheer helplessness. They become unable to avoid distasteful material, unable to bear the thought of others experiencing it, unable to allow it to even exist: and that final sentiment leads to censorship.

    The preface “As a woman/African American/Muslim/gay man, I…” is used as a priori authority for subsequent statements. Being a member of minority subsets lends supposed authoritative or authentic insight and leads the speaker to demanding redress as a victim of systematic oppression, institutional discrimination or casual offence. Conversely, certain subsets (male, heterosexual, white) are viewed by post-liberals as less authentic and valued due to historically inherited privilege (7). The language of victimhood now dominates political discourse. The statement “I am offended by…” now carries weight in debates when all it demonstrates is the capacity of the speaker to articulate a temporary and subjective position that is as incontrovertible and inarguable as it is substantially meaningless. Rather than points being argued between equals on the basis of logic and evidence, common discourse is now between representatives of inherently unequal subsets and hinges on depth of feeling (8).

    Now that emotional response has been accorded the status of a legitimate, quasi-legal grievance, why should a religious person who expresses genuine (or tactical) offence be denied redress? When a fundamentalist is denied parity by authorities that advocate “a respect agenda” but cannot legally curtail blasphemy, is it any wonder he sees double standards? Post-liberal identity politics promises emotional justice but betrays partiality by supporting favoured minorities under the auspices of “hate speech” but hesitating to censor blasphemy. Encouraging individuals to validate themselves through identifying with cultural subsets and maintaining a double standard separating anti-religious speech from hate speech are both practices that strengthen the agenda of Western Islamists.

    The way to establish impartiality and strengthen free speech is 1) for state organisations and politicians to disengage from identity politics and to refuse to endorse emotional grievance as a matter for civil or criminal legislation, and 2) for the rescinding of laws regarding hate speech, prevention of “glorification of terrorism”, blasphemy and all restrictions on speech which fall short of incitement, with existing laws on harassment, threatening behaviour and other criminal acts being applied to those who infringe the safety and liberty of others.

    There is little likelihood of this proposal being taken up, as these changes conflict with the will of the (apparent) majority of the populace and political class. Notwithstanding, the principles of identity politics and restrictions on free speech deserve to be opposed because they are intellectually flawed, morally invidious and practically counterproductive.

    Towards Thought Reform

    If that picture of identity politics and policed civility seems exaggerated, think back twenty or thirty years. Would you then have expected people to be sacked from positions in public and private organisations for expressing contentious political or social opinions, even in private settings? Would the use of certain forbidden words have led to public outcries which would force the speaker to publically recant? Aren’t those accused of infractions of civility offered the possibility of rehabilitation only if they express sufficient contrition? Don’t those sound like the tactics of totalitarian regimes, where enforced self-criticism and public shaming were used to suppress dissent and discredit troublesome individuals? Aren’t these now the norms we have grown to expect in Western democracies? Isn’t “hate speech” today akin to the catch-all terms such as “counter-revolutionary activity” used to smother political criticism in dictatorships? In today’s Britain it is unremarkable to be publically shamed for a drunken remark, not so much for the words but the thought they express. Whether or not speech crime is punished as a matter of politics or politesse makes no practical difference. Likewise, it is immaterial whether punitive sanction is enforced by legal authorities or social opprobrium. It is the imposition of the tyranny of the majority on the minority who express harmless (albeit unpleasant) ideas.

    The point is not whether we adjudge racism, creationism, Islamism, banning abortion and so forth to be wrong; what matters is whether we are allowed to discuss such things openly because once we forfeit our right to speak (and listen to) controversial matters we forgo our critical intelligence. In allowing the limitation of free speech we give up an important part of what makes us human and such a restriction will soon enough be used against the leftists and liberals who champion enforced civility (9). Listening to a foolish opinion is not “giving it legitimacy” in the post-liberal parlance, for how can we test our ideas without arguing for them and against their opposites? (10) How is an untested principle qualitatively different from an inherited prejudice? How can we know the truth without investigating a spectrum of possibility? How can we improve and educate ourselves without encountering new ideas, even incorrect ones?

    We live in a multicultural society where people do not mix but live parallel lives surrounded by their own kind, educated in single-faith schools, at a time when the public arena has become ever more anodyne. This is today’s political and social climate, where rather than ridicule and out-argue opinions we consider wrong, we suppress them. The Enlightenment principle of freedom for people to speak as they wish within the law is now supported by only a minority of politicians. University debate societies have a “no platform” policy for politically radical speakers, when speech is seen as so dangerous and hurtful it cannot be tolerated. In class, American academics issue “trigger warnings” which flag up potentially disturbing material so students can absent themselves in order to avoid experiencing distress. Books, magazines and songs are banned from campuses and student-union speech codes forbid the use of certain words. As Greg Lukianoff puts it, students demand not freedom of speech but freedom from speech (11).

    This essay’s argument looks illogical, yoking as it does apparent opponents – religious fundamentalists and proponents of socially progressive policy. Yet if one examines the tendencies, it is possible to see they overlap. Both groups believe their moral certainties trump the rights of others to contest those certainties. Both are attached to emotional ideas of justice rather than application of rationalism. Both believe ends justify means and are strongly paternalistic. Both use group pressure to suppress dissent. Neither considers free speech an inviolable right and both seek to use legal means to outlaw transgressive speech and action. Both believe that there are correct ways not only of acting but of thinking. Neither wishes to examine too deeply their idées fixes. Both are averse to reassessing core ideas in the light of new information.

    These supposed opponents share common roots; they share aims and collaborate. Witness the political alliance of Respect, a party of self-identifying Muslims (including a splinter of extremists) working alongside Feminists, environmentalists, disaffected Marxists and supporters of the New Left. There are extensive formal and informal links between far-left groups and Islamic political organisations for the purposes of opposing imperialism and global capitalisation. On campuses, student unions and religious societies uneasily act in concert to oppose dissent through hate-speech policies. It is in the interests of both tendencies to maintain official mechanisms to gag criticism.

    Resisting Enforced Civility

    In many Western nations we are living under de facto sharia law with regard to images of Mohammed. We are routinely told that “the depiction of Mohammed in any form is deeply offensive”; actually depictions of Mohammed were historically made by members of Shia and African Muslim traditions and were not considered offensive or even noteworthy. The prohibitions derive from interpretations in the hadith (12) rather than the Koran itself and the common acceptance of the prohibition may be due to the influence of Wahhabism (13). Yet despite this, museum curators in the UK censor historical images of Mohammed by Muslim artists, deleting images on museum websites and not publically displaying examples (14). British newspapers refused to reprint the Danish and Charlie Hebdo cartoons. This rigid observance of a partial (and contested) cultural injunction displays the zealously cautious management of post-liberal-led institutions (15) and is an example of a concession to religion which has already curtailed freedom of expression.

    Advocating voluntary restraint of speech (on grounds of common civility, community harmony or fear of violence) ultimately establishes a climate of silence in which any criticism of Islam can be dismissed as provocation (racism qua Islamophobia), a label used to discredit critics (16). When valuable articulate comment of a critical nature needs to be expressed it may search in vain for newspapers and book proprietors willing publish it. The cartoons of Mohammed were anything but reasoned critique, and may be considered to have “poisoned the well” for moderate critics, but extremists are not reasonable people. Islamists seek to suppress critical opinions (17). Extremists exploit identity politics through use of argument or legal recourse to further their cause but they do not consider these channels to have authority – only their God has authority – and some of them will burn buildings and books and cut throats.

    In coming years, not only extreme but moderate Muslims too will press for blasphemy laws and warn that offensive material will (regrettably) be countered by acts of violence; post-liberals will urge restraint on speech for the sake of community harmony; satirists and critics will grow ever more cautious. If makers and consumers of the arts, and the public more generally, do not assert that free speech is non-negotiable and that any legal speech (even distasteful speech) is permitted, then post-liberals will offer further concessions and anti-free-speech activists will make further advances. Extremists will occupy any territory vacated by others.

    While many of us may feel confident that the evident extremeness of religious fundamentalism means it will never make inroads into our way of life, we overlook the willingness with which post-liberals (who are in the mainstream of society and in positions of power) offer concessions to religious sentiment and give away our freedoms to assuage their guilt, in a form of emotional reparations. The freedom to speak your mind has already been snipped away by post-liberals, religious extremists, New Left supporters, commercial lobbyists, social conservatives and paternalistic government.

    The only way to preserve free speech is to exercise it. Otherwise, the opportunity to use it will be taken from you (by means both overt and covert), the channels of speech will atrophy, and when your time to speak comes you will be unable to do so.

    Notes

    1. Alternative adjectives are unsatisfactory: redefining “liberal” is problematic, as well as time-consuming in a short essay; “neo-liberal” refers to a specific school of economic thought; “illiberal” is merely an insult; “Politically Correct” is idiomatically awkward and has particular connotations of campaigning leftism (though a largely pejorative term, it accurately indicates genuine intolerance towards opposing political ideas); “post-liberal” is a workable though inadequate neologism indicating an outlook that claims to be liberal but no longer conforms to liberal founding principles (see “Identity politics” below).
    2. God is Great (no. 2) (1991), presented 2005.
    3. ComRes poll of British Muslims, conducted for the BBC, 25 February 2015: those who believe British law must be obeyed 93%; those who “have some sympathy for the Charlie Hebdo killers” 27%; those who say violence against publishers of [presumably offensive] images of Mohammed is never justified 68%, disagree 24%.
    4. On the role of anger, insecurity, humiliation, lack of power and other aspects in the psychology of extremists see Arno Gruen, Peter Coleman & Andrea Bartoli. For a view of extremist violence as primarily tactic strategy see Eli Berman. Coleman & Bartoli also discuss extremism as strategy.
    5. “Halal”: permitted; “Haram”: forbidden
    6. For discussion of this transition in the context of the visual arts, see Paul Wood, Western Art & the Wider World (2014), Wiley Blackwell.
    7. Respectively, the argument-from-authority and argument-against-authority logic fallacies.
    8. See John Stuart Mill’s analysis of the way dissent is silenced by social oppression, On Liberty (1859).
    9. Note that this essay argues only the utilitarian case for free expression; there is an entirely separate argument in favour of free expression as a human right; see Thomas Paine, et al.
    10. On the wrongness of people suppressing opposition: “If the [opposing] opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.” Mill, On Liberty ch. II.
    11. Greg Lukianoff, Freedom From Speech (2014), Encounter Broadside.
    12. Interpretative commentaries on the Koran.
    13. Wahhabism is an ultra-orthodox interpretation of Islam native to the Arabian Peninsula, which has been promoted internationally by the Saudi royal family.
    14. The Victoria & Albert Museum removed an image of Mohammed by a Persian artist from its website in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack.
    15. The BBC has issued conflicting statements about whether or not images of Mohammed are prohibited for broadcast or simply avoided. The point is a moot one as the BBC does not show images of Mohammed, regardless of being the result of official guideline or unspoken consensus.
    16. An example of argumentum ad hominem, an attack on the proposer of an idea rather than the idea itself.
    17. This discussion centres on Islamist expansionism and largely omits discussion of the position of moderate Muslims. Do moderates wish to oppose the sectarianisation of the secular West or are they in favour of some (or all) additional restraints on free speech? There will be as many views on this as there are Western Muslims. It is worth remembering that many moderates suffer soonest and most from pressure and influence of Islamists in their own communities and families. This is especially true of adherents of Shia and Sufi traditions who are persecuted by Wahhabi extremists.

    Alexander Adams, 2015